Intelligence Battles Resurface Over North Korea

by Steve

The ramifications of this administration’s politicization of intelligence, uncaring attitude toward nuclear proliferation, and extortion and mistreatment of its allies are all on display in how Bush has mishandled the growing problem in North Korea. According to David Sanger in today’s New York Times, there is a deep division within the administration as to whether or not Pyongyang is bluffing about its possession of nuclear weapons, and in a new twist, one of our closest and most strategic allies tried to turn the tables on us and force us to engage.

New intelligence estimates that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons in recent months — or perhaps more — have immersed the administration in another internal debate about the quality of intelligence about illegal weapons.

(S)ome of (Bush’s) advisers say it is possible that North Korea is telling the truth about having turned 8,000 nuclear fuel rods into enough weapons-grade plutonium for several warheads.

Others, including more cautious intelligence analysts at the State Department, say there is still no proof, and plenty of incentive for the North Koreans to bluff.

The obsession with Iraq and use of phony intelligence, the lack of consistency of this administration over its handling of nonproliferation issues and the “Axis of Evil”, and inattention to dealing with North Korea during a critical time is coming home to roost.

Charles Pritchard, who resigned this summer as the State Department special envoy for North Korean nuclear issues, cast Mr. Bush's political and strategic problem this way:

"We've gone, under his watch, from the possibility that North Korea has one or two weapons to a possibility — a distinct possibility — that it now has eight or more," said Mr. Pritchard, who also worked on North Korean issues during the Clinton administration. "And it's happened while we were deposing Saddam Hussein for fear he might get that same capability by the end of the decade."

The same internal combatants are lining up in the same camps again as to what they believe about the intelligence. The difference this time though is their willingness to deal with it or put it off, even though it is now clear that by rejecting any direct engagement to get assets into the North and deconstruct the program, the Bushies have allowed Pyongyang to go nuclear right under their noses.

The debate over what is actually going on in some ways mirrors the arguments that unfolded a year ago over how to interpret contradictory intelligence about Iraq.

Hawks in the administration, from the White House to the vice president's office to the Pentagon, argue that it is entirely possible that all 8,017 spent-fuel rods stored in North Korea since 1994 have been converted into bomb fuel. They note that when the North last turned fuel rods into bombs, in 1991, they went undetected by intelligence agencies for years.

Yet the Iraq experience has bred significant caution among intelligence agencies, now more careful than ever about overinterpreting the evidence.

The same problem that bedeviled us in Iraq, a lack of onsite assets gathering intelligence and a reliance on outdated and suspect assessments is hovering over our heads with the North.

"Our knowledge of North Korea is so limited that you have to sympathize with the poor intelligence analysts who have to make sense of all this," said Joel S. Wit, a former State Department official who visited a site five years ago that the C.I.A. believed was a new reprocessor, only to find a huge hole in the ground. "The ramifications of a screw-up are pretty big: that you've missed a second facility, or that they have reprocessed and we haven't picked it up. Either one of those is a pretty terrifying thought."

Instead of grabbing a deal where we could get IAEA inspectors back into North Korea to first-hand oversee the build-down and cataloging of Pyongyang’s capabilities, the Cheney-led policy of the administration is to stall for time until after the 2004 election and hide behind multilateral discussions with allies who question our ultimate commitment to a nonmilitary solution.

And the South, tired of watching the US dilly-dally and fight internally about whether to engage directly and push for a settlement with the North, took a page out of our handling of allies in the run-up to Iraq and played hardball with us:

South Korea's foreign minister, Yoon Young Kwan, held a heated meeting with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell last month in New York, demanding that Mr. Bush respond to North Korea's call for security treaties and a plan for gradual improvement in economic relations in return for dismantling any nuclear facilities. In a twist that angered Mr. Powell, the South Korean said his new president, Roh Moo Hyun, would not consider sending any troops to aid in Iraq unless the United States gave ground on North Korea.

Mr. Powell, according to several officials familiar with the exchange, curtly told told him, "That is not how allies deal with each other."

Sure Colin. Try telling that to the Turks or the Pakistanis, the Coalition of the Bribed, or “Old Europe.” We just had our own Rumsfeldian ally management course rammed back down our throats by Seoul.

Tell Mr. Sanger what you think of this issue and how the South has turned our behavior towards allies back against us. His email is dasang@nytimes.com.