Fallout from Najaf

by soccerdad

Since the peaceful end to the Najaf situation there have been a number of people who have tried to figure out who the winners and losers are. There is complete agreement about only one thing and that the US is a loser. The primary reason is the damage to the Shrine, the bombing of the holy cemetary, and the complete disregard the Shia culture.

It seems that its going to take a while longer before the rest shakes itself out. There was a report on Sat that the 4 Ayatollahs had met and announced that violence was not the appropiate way to protest against the continued American occupation. Link

However, a report today contradicts this. Hamid al-Khafaf, the spokesman for Grand Ayat Allah Ali al-Sistani, denied that the Shia authority in a meeting on Saturday expressed opposition to armed resistance. Link

More details about the settlement have emerged. Australian news is reporting that as part of the deal brokered by Al-Sistani Sadr's men were allowed to keep their guns and grenade launchers. Link

Sistani and the other Ayatollahs have always supported what has been termed a "quietism". They do not feel that the clerics should be leading the country or heavily involved in politics (at least visibly). So what to make of the situation. One possibility was that Sistani's main concern was simply to insure that Imam Ali shrine was spared further damage and that political fallout was not his concern. There is another possibility. Sistani wants the elections held on time and the US out. By letting Sadr keep his weapons almost ensures that the fighting is not over. This combined with a refusal to condemn further the use of violence to protest the occupation would keep pressure on the US and Allawi.

It will be interesting to see how the experts like Juan Cole evaluate the situation in the coming days.

Sadr and Sistani represent two different views about politics in Iraq. As noted above Sistani has the "quietist" approach. Sadr wants a fundamentalist government more like Iran. An article published in the Eqyptian paper Al-Ahram challanges the clerics such as Sistani to become more involved or else more and more will drift to the fundamentalist approach of Sadr.

The lack of action on the part of the Hawza (the Shia school of learning) has always encouraged, and empowered, other contenders for authority in the Shia community. Yet, in the past, the Hawza managed to maintain its prestige, thanks to the gullibility of the people. But today's average Shia follower is more sophisticated and well informed. Questioning authority is the main feature in a free society, and the Ayatollahs are no exception among all other forms of authority. They cannot hide behind their theological jargon in the middle of crises. If they fail to act, someone else will pick the pieces, and life continues forward

Those young and energetic men who are being driven to the rank and file of Al-Sadr movement are sending a message to the grand Ayatollahs that time has come to set aside the discourse over ablution and purity and types of water, and start paying attention to the affairs that matter in a world that is moving at the speed of light. It is no longer acceptable for a leader to hand down two written lines and remain aloof from the masses. Unlike their counterparts in Iran, Lebanon, and elsewhere, the Ayatollahs of the Iraqi Hawza have been unapproachable for decades. This is not a viable method to lead a crowd so used to demystifying its icons and role models

The phenomenon of Moqtada Al- Sadr is a testimony to the sorry state of affairs in the Shia community. It proves, inter alia, that the old links no longer bind the leader and his constituency. Therefore, the question must not be, "what is wrong with the Shia who rally around Moqtada Al- Sadr?" Rather, it must be, "what is wrong with the grand Ayatollahs who lose their constituents to Moqtada Al- Sadr?"

So it will be interesting to see if Al-Sistani takes a more active role. He has agreat deal of power at the moment.