Can elections save Iraq?

by soccerdad

Its possible that the only thing keeping Iraq from just exploding is the promise of elections by the end of January 2005. The reasoning is that al Sistani the most revered Shia cleric in Iraq has taken a peaceful, cooperative approach. He has made it clear that elections must be held in January and the elections need to be fair and properly represent the Shia majority. He also expects the US to leave after successful elections.

I think everyone understands that the violence in Iraq makes the elections less likely to be held on time. There are many areas not under US control. It has been suggested that elections could be delayed or not held at all in such areas as Fallujah. However, this would raise serious issues regarding the legitimacy of the elections.

It seems clear that the US and Allawi will wage a stronger campaign against strongholds not under US control. There has been increased activity in Fallujah but an all out offensive is unlikely to occur before the US elections. (WaPo

Lets look at how the Americans have interacted with al Sistani. He is the most revered Shia cleric in Iraq. He has been cooperative, peaceful, and has expressed no interest in a political position for himself. It would seem as if you would want to curry his favor, especially if you are interested in developing a truly democratic Iraq.

First the US rejected Sistani’s choice, Shahristani, for prime minister choosing instead the former CIA operative Allawi.

Previously, I wrote here about Allawi had replaced Sistani’s closest ally in the government, Dr Rubaie with a close ally. It was thought that Dr. Rubaie was too moderate as it was he who was trying to draw Sadr into the political process. In addition, during the time Sistani was in London, Hussein Shahristani a close associate of Sistani was quoted as saying

"It's clear to everyone there's very strong polarization in the country, and unless we can accommodate each other, there is no way we can move forward," Shahristani said. "No amount of military force can solve this problem." (see Needlenose

Dr. Rubaie had brokered a deal with Sadr which Allawi backed out on. The leaders of the the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and al-Dawa parties did not want the deal with Sadr. These two groups have the two largest Shia militias which have been untouched.

Sistani who seems to have the true interest of the Iraqi people in mind rather than how much power he can grab for himself was also unhappy with the national Conference.

The national conference initially was conceived as "a platform for the whole Iraqi political spectrum to participate in a national debate to take the political process forward to prepare elections," Shahristani said. "The way it's been handled so far, the conference has been dominated by the parties that were running the Governing Council, and this has not encouraged other political actors.

The parties Shahristani meant were the Kurdish factions, Iyad Allawi's party -- and SCIRI and al-Dawa. Rather than allow an open process to dilute their influence over the training-wheels legislative assembly that was being created, these parties schemed in private to keep the vast bulk of the seats for themselves. (They were so successful, in fact, that the conference never voted on who would be in the assembly, because the parties' machinations forced the competing slate to be declared ineligible.) from Needlenose

A NYT piece on sept 23 had this

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, the nation's most powerful Shiite leader, is growing increasingly concerned that nationwide elections could be delayed, his aides said, and has even threatened to withdraw his support for the elections unless changes are made to increase the representation of Shiites, according to one Iraqi source close to him.

Aides to Ayatollah Sistani contacted Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria, the United Nations adviser who brokered the agreement to hold the elections, planned for January, to express concern that they would be delayed, according to Hamid Khaffaf, one of Ayatollah Sistani's top aides.

Another source close to the electoral negotiations said Ayatollah Sistani had asked Mr. Brahimi to return to Iraq to try to address his concerns. Mr. Khaffaf declined to discuss details of the conversation.

. . . According to people with knowledge of the talks, Ayatollah Sistani is concerned that the nascent democratic process here is falling under the control of a handful of the largest political parties, which cooperated with the American occupation and are comprised largely of exiles.

In particular, these sources say, Ayatollah Sistani is worried about discussions now under way among those parties to form a single ticket for the elections, thus limiting the choices of voters and smothering smaller political parties

Apparently, Sistani is so upset that he is threatening to declare the election illegitimate. This would have major implications since he is held is such high regard by the Shiite majority.

Now Needlenose has a very interesting take on this

Which leads me back to the notion of Sistani orchestrating an end run around the U.S./Allawi rigged-election scheme. In a comment yesterday, haydar speculated about a "national salvation government" formed with the support of the Shiite and Sunni religious leadership (such as the association of Sunni clerics who have already announced Sistani deeply dislikes the Mahdi Army, but he no doubt feels that if the various parties cannot trust that a settlement under his auspices can be trusted, it will weaken his authority to help settle future disputes.their boycott of the January elections). I'd guess that Sistani may have been sounding out Brahimi about ways that the UN could support or even participate in this developing alternative.

On Monday and Tues Marines and Iraqi National Guard raided offices of the Muqtada al-Sadr movement near the shrine of Ali, arresting several officials close to the radical young cleric. This appears to be a violation of the cease fire with Sadr negotiated by Sistani. Sistani quickly and forcefully criticized the raid. Juan Cole had this point about this development. Sistani deeply dislikes the Mahdi Army, but he no doubt feels that if the various parties cannot trust that a settlement under his auspices can be trusted, it will weaken his authority to help settle future disputes. This raises the question if this was done purposely to make Sistani appear weaker?

In summary, its very difficult to envision a path that leads to legitmate elections by January. The current level of violence is the first obstacle. I would predict the US using much more force against places like Fallujah afterNov 3. More importantly, it seems to methat the US is really not interested in “legitimate” elections in the strict sense. It is becoming clear that the Iraqi exiles want to take as much power for themselves as they can get. The quid pro quo is that they would then support continued US presence in Iraq. After the elections the US would be free to increase even further its level of force against insurgents. What about Sistani as well as the Sunni clerics who very much want the US out of Iraq? I would bet that there will further attempts to make Sistani look weak in the eyes of the Shias. If that doesn’t work Ambassador Negroponte has many creative ways of dealing with people who aren’t with the program.

So the US will install by manipulation a “democratic” government who will approve of its tactics and goals. There is no way the US will tolerate a true democratically elected governement that would then ask it to leave. In allthe time the US has been in Iraq how many political initiatives have there been?

What will the violence be like in case the elections are perceived to be illegtimate? Thats hard to predict. It willdepend on Sistani's response, if he's still around. The US strategy for the insurgency was made clear by Rummy who said (paraphrasing) eventually they will tire of being killed.