9/11 Commission Credibility In Question - They Were Told About Able Danger's Tracking Of Atta

by Steve

You’ll recall that earlier in the week, it was reported that GOP congressmen Curt Weldon, who has made amplified claims about threats against this country, nonetheless reported that the Pentagon identified and tracked Mohammed Atta and three other associates through a secret military unit and operation called Able Danger as far back as the Summer of 2000, but failed to inform the CIA or FBI about Atta’s whereabouts and Al Qaeda activities. In response to Weldon’s assertions, the 9/11 Commission said it wanted Congress to investigate why the Pentagon had not disclosed its knowledge of Atta and this Al Qaeda cell to either the Commission. Further, the Commission staff stated that military officials involved in Able Danger had not told the Commission investigators about Atta during their interviews.

Commissioner John Lehman said earlier in the week that there should be a congressional investigation as to why the Pentagon had not told the Commission or its staff about Able Danger's tracking and knowledge of Atta over a year before 9/11.

It now turns out that the Commission staff were lying, and that it appears that the military officials did in fact tell the Commission staff about their monitoring of Atta, but it was the Commission staff that decided to leave this information out of the final 9/11 report because some of the dates that the Able Danger staff had provided the Commission investigators about Atta’s activities didn’t square with what the Commission staff had developed on their own. And who was the staff director who decided to leave this information from the Able Danger officials out of the report, and not tell the Commissioners that the Pentagon withheld such information from the FBI and CIA?

None other than Condi Rice's current soulmate inside the State Department, Philip D. Zelikow, who has ties to the Bush family that go way back.

Remember that the Commission staff were quick to dismiss the possibility that the Able Danger officials had in fact told the Commission staff about their tracking of Atta more than a year before 9/11. The Commission’s final report has already been criticized in some quarters for being too quick in absolving the military of any negligence, and for not asking more questions, rather than rewriting the narrative to absolve those in power. So how much credibility should we place in the 9/11 Commission report knowing that the Commission staff’s initial response to the Able Danger claims was in fact a lie?