WMDgate: Fixing Intelligence Around Policy - The Aluminum Tubes, Part 2A-1
by eriposte
This post is part of a series (see Introduction and Part 1) focused on building a case to demonstrate the Bush White House's intelligence manipulation, fixing and misrepresentation, mostly using published Congressional reports like the Phase I Senate (SSCI) Report, the Robb-Silberman WMD Commission Report, etc. While it is clear that even without the use of Congressional reports, the case against the Bush White House is pretty solid - see here and here for example - I wanted to demonstrate that the parliamentary reports, rather than make the case against the White House weaker, actually make it stronger. [Note: All extracts from published reports may have lost some original formatting (in particular, italics). This is unintentional, but it does not change the meaning or content in any way.]
As a continuation from Part 1, Part 2A focuses on the following question:
Which intelligence reports would Rice, Cheney, and Bush would have to have not read in order to make the claim(s) in early September 2002, that Iraq was buying aluminum tubes specifically to enrich uranium in centrifuges?
In this part (2A-1), the focus is on CIA intelligence (intel) reports prior to early September 2002 (in subsequent parts, I will discuss intel reports from other agencies). Stated differently, I answer the question of whether the Bush administration's "ignorance" excuse, based on blaming the CIA for not telling them about possible alternate uses of the aluminum tubes, holds any water.
The discussion is divided into the following sections.
1. Introduction
2. Senate (SSCI) Report
3. Robb-Silberman WMD Commission Report
4. Conclusions
1. Introduction
Since the early September 2002 claims of Condi Rice, Dick Cheney and George Bush were that the aluminum tubes were being purchased by Iraq specifically to enrich uranium in centrifuges (for an alleged nuclear weapons program), the Bush administration was faced with the issue of how to explain the fact that the U.S. intelligence community (IC) did not, in fact, have a consensus at that time on the end use of the aluminum tubes, and that there were strong dissenting views within the IC that said that the tubes were more directly suited to a conventional weapons application (like rockets). In an attempt to save face, the Bush administration dished out some bizarre spin. This New York Times article from October 2004 captures the essence of that spin (bold text is my emphasis):
Precisely how knowledge of the intelligence dispute traveled through the upper reaches of the administration is unclear. Ms. Rice knew about the debate before her Sept. 2002 CNN appearance, but only learned of the alternative rocket theory of the tubes soon afterward, according to two senior administration officials. President Bush learned of the debate at roughly the same time, a senior administration official said.
Last week, when asked about the tubes, administration officials said they relied on repeated assurances by George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, that the tubes were in fact for centrifuges. They also noted that the intelligence community, including the Energy Department, largely agreed that Mr. Hussein had revived his nuclear program.
''These judgments sometimes require members of the intelligence community to make tough assessments about competing interpretations of facts,'' said Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the president.
Mr. Tenet declined to be interviewed. But in a statement, he said he ''made it clear'' to the White House ''that the case for a possible nuclear program in Iraq was weaker than that for chemical and biological weapons.'' Regarding the tubes, Mr. Tenet said ''alternative views were shared'' with the administration after the intelligence community drafted a new National Intelligence Estimate in late September 2002.
Thus, the basic spin was that Rice, Cheney and Bush only knew of the possible alternative uses of the tubes (and the "rocket theory") *after* they had claimed that the tubes were specifically for nuclear centrifuges. Of course, the spin made no sense because the acknowledgement that "Ms. Rice knew about the debate before her Sept. 2002 CNN appearance" meant that she knew that alternative uses were possible (even if she did not know who in the IC was pushing the alternative view, which itself is impossible to believe). After all, the debate was that alternative uses are possible, and that it was not certain that the tubes were for centrifuges. Nevertheless, let us continue to see what additional spin was put out.
The Times article discusses the CIA intel reports, which the Bush administration was using as the scapegoat (emphasis mine):
From April 2001 to September 2002, the agency [CIA] wrote at least 15 reports on the tubes. Many were sent only to high-level policy makers, including President Bush, and did not circulate to other intelligence agencies. None have been released, though some were described in the Senate's report.
Several senior C.I.A. officials insisted that those reports did describe at least in general terms the intelligence debate. ''You don't go into all that detail but you do try to evince it when you write your current product,'' one agency official said.
But several Congressional and intelligence officials with access to the 15 assessments said not one of them informed senior policy makers of the Energy Department's dissent. They described a series of reports, some with ominous titles, that failed to convey either the existence or the substance of the intensifying debate.
Over and over, the reports restated Joe's main conclusions for the C.I.A. -- that the tubes matched the 1950's Zippe centrifuge design and were built to specifications that ''exceeded any known conventional weapons application.'' They did not state what Energy Department experts had noted -- that many common industrial items, even aluminum cans, were made to specifications as good or better than the tubes sought by Iraq. Nor did the reports acknowledge a significant error in Joe's claim -- that the tubes ''matched'' those used in a Zippe centrifuge.
As I discuss below, some of the claims of the "several Congressional and intelligence officials with access to the 15 assessments" were highly misleading and objectively false. After all, if the CIA reports "did describe at least in general terms the intelligence debate" then, by definition, they conveyed to President Bush and his cabinet, the fact that alternative uses for the tubes were possible. Again, the debate was that alternative uses are possible, and that it was not certain that the tubes were for centrifuges.
So, let's ask the original question again, with a qualifier:
Which CIA intelligence reports would Rice, Cheney, and Bush would have to have not read in order to make the claim(s) in early September 2002, that Iraq was buying aluminum tubes specifically to enrich uranium in centrifuges?
Short answer: Many, many reports.
Long answer: Let's answer this question by looking at what we know about those CIA intel reports published prior to early September 2002.
2. Senate (SSCI) Report
If you read the Senate (SSCI) Report on the topic of the aluminum tubes, it becomes obvious that although the CIA reports repeatedly tried their best to prop up the fake nuclear centrifuge theory advanced by a WINPAC analyst named Joe, there was at least one report (and maybe even two) that mentioned the possibility of alternative uses for the tubes. The Senate Report also makes it clear that the reports were highly classified and intended for the White House. Here are some passages from the SSCI report that discuss some of the CIA reporting on the tubes (bold text is my emphasis):
Soon after receiving the initial intelligence report, the CIA assessed that the tubes were probably intended for an Iraqi uranium enrichment centrifuge program.[10] Although coordinated with other WINPAC analysts, the CIA's initial analysis was based largely on the work of a centrifuge analyst in the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC). This analyst had [SENTENCE DELETED]. The CIA published its first assessment on the aluminum tubes on April 10, 2001 [11], noting that they "have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program." (Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [SEIB] 01-083CHX) The assessment did not provide any details outlining why the CIA assessed that the tubes were probably intended for a centrifuge program, but noted, "using aluminum tubes in a centrifuge effort would be inefficient and a step backward from the specialty steel machines Iraq was poised to mass produce at the onset of the Gulf War. Iraq successfully used outdated enrichment technologies, such as its electromagnetic isotope separation effort, before the war."
...
On June 14, 2001, the CIA produced a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) which said that China [SENTENCE DELETED]. The assessment noted that the tubes are, "controlled items under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Chinese export laws, are suitable for uranium enrichment gas centrifuge rotors and, while less likely, could be used as rocket bodies for multiple rocket launchers." This CIA assessment also did not provide any further details outlining why the CIA assessed the tubes were more likely to be used for centrifuge rotors.
...
From July 2001 to July 2002, the CIA produced at least nine additional intelligence [DELETED] discussing Iraq's aluminum tube procurement efforts. None of these assessments provided any additional information to support the CIA's analysis that the tubes were probably intended for Iraq's nuclear program, other than what was stated in the July 2001 assessment; the tubes matched the 1950s Zippe centrifuge design and the tubes' specifications far exceeded those for any known conventional weapons application. Most of the assessments were disseminated in limited channels, only to high-level policymakers and were not available to intelligence analysts from other agencies. In a written response to a question from the Committee, the CIA said these products were limited in their distribution because they were intended for the President, drafted in response to specific policymaker questions, or were very narrow in scope.
...
Although the IC had been debating this issue for almost a year and a half, the DCI testified at a Committee hearing that he was unaware of the debate until mid-September of 2002.
That's not all.
First of all, notice that the SSCI Report provides only brief highlights of the contents of the CIA reports (of course many of the claims in those reports about the centrifuge theory were incorrect/false, as the SSCI report points out later). So, unless the details of the CIA reports are made available, it is hard to conclude that none of the reports even mention DOE or INR alternative views and/or alternative uses of the tubes.
Secondly, the SSCI Report's coverage of the CIA reports is supplemented by the Robb-Silberman report. So, let's turn our attention to that.
3. Robb-Silberman WMD Commission Report
The Robb-Silberman WMD Commission Report provides some detail on additional CIA reports on the aluminum tubes (emphasis mine):
CIA subsequently identified possible non-nuclear applications for the tubes, [27] but continued to judge that the tubes were destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges [28] --even while acknowledging that the Intelligence Community had very little information on Iraq's WMD programs to corroborate this assessment. [29]
...
While noting that there was disagreement within the Intelligence Community concerning the most likely use for the tubes, the CIA pointed out that there was also interagency consensus that the tubes could be used for centrifuge enrichment. [35]
Let's look at references 27, 28 and 35, shall we? (emphasis mine)
[27] See, e.g. , CIA, Iraq's Current Nuclear Capabilities (June 20, 2001) (noting that although the tubes are "more consistent" with a centrifuge application, "we are also considering non-nuclear applications for the tubes"); Senior Executive Memorandum, What We Knew About Iraq's Centrifuge-Based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and After the Gulf War (Nov. 24, 2001) (noting that there are "divergent views" about the intended use of the tubes).
[28] See, e.g., Senior Executive Memorandum, The Iraqi Threat (Dec. 15, 2001) ("[W]e believe a shipment of...tubes...[are] destined for use in Iraqi gas centrifuges."); Senior Publish When Ready, Title Classified (June 30, 2001) (noting that Iraq is likely to argue that the tubes are for conventional or civilian use, a use "that cannot be discounted," but also noting that the specifications for the tubes "far exceed any known conventional weapons application, including rocket motor casings for 81mm" MRLs).
...
[35] Senior Executive Memorandum, What We Knew About Iraq's Centrifuge-Based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and After the Gulf War (Nov. 24, 2001); Senior Executive Memorandum, The Iraq Threat (Dec. 15, 2001); DCI Statement for the Record at Tab 1, p. 19....
So, what does this all mean?
4. Conclusions
Despite the ridiculously sparse coverage of the detailed contents of the CIA intel reports on the aluminum tubes in both the SSCI Report and the Robb-Silberman report, the available information in these "bipartisan" reports makes it clear that:
(a) Multiple CIA intel reports prior to early September 2002 clearly indicated that the aluminum tubes could possibly be used in applications other than nuclear centrifuges. As I have highlighted above, at least five CIA reports made this clear - and these were the reports on:
- June 14, 2001
- June 20, 2001
- June 30, 2001
- Nov 24, 2001
- Dec 15, 2001
(b) At least one of the CIA intel reports prior to early September 2002 clearly indicated that the aluminum tubes could be used in rocket bodies in rocket launchers. This was the report dated:
- June 14, 2001
(c) At least one of the CIA intel reports prior to early September 2002 even suggested that "using aluminum tubes in a centrifuge effort would be inefficient and a step backward from the specialty steel machines Iraq was poised to mass produce at the onset of the Gulf War". This was the report dated:
- April 10, 2001
(d) Since the SSCI Report and Silberman-Robb Report do not provide complete details on the CIA reports on aluminum tubes issued between April 2001 and September 2002, there is no reason to believe that the number of CIA reports mentioning alternative uses of the tubes is limited to the ones discussed above. It is entirely possible, and in fact likely, that other CIA reports in this time period did mention that alternative uses of the aluminum tubes were possible. This is supported by the text in the NYT article (see Section 1) which says that the CIA reports "did describe at least in general terms the intelligence debate".
Therefore, the fact that most (if not all) of these highly classified CIA reports were specifically generated for the White House (as highlighted in Section 2), makes it clear that the claim that:
Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney or George Bush never acknowledged possible alternative uses for the aluminum tubes on or before September 12, 2002 because they were never told about the possibility of alternative uses by the CIA prior to that...
...is clearly a lie.
Indeed, the acknowledgement in the New York Times article (Section 1) that "Ms. Rice knew about the debate before her Sept. 2002 CNN appearance" meant that she knew that alternative uses were possible (even if she did not know who in the IC was pushing the alternative view, which itself is impossible to believe).
Let me emphasize that Rice's admission was truly astonishing spin - a mastery in fakery designed for a compliant and conservatively tilted mainstream media (at that time). Here's what she said:
Rice said she was vaguely aware of a debate about the tubes but believed that the intelligence community "as a whole" agreed they were meant for nuclear weapons work.
"If you're a policymaker, you do not want to end up on the short side," she said on CNN's "Late Edition."
Rice said that when she said the tubes were "only really suited for nuclear weapons programs," she "knew there was some debate out there but ... I didn't know the nature of the debate."
The debate was over whether the tubes might have been intended for use not in nuclear weapons but rather in small artillery launchers.
The only debate was whether the tubes could be used in other applications than nuclear weapons. That was the debate. So to claim that she didn't know about the "nature" of the debate makes no sense if she knew there "was some debate"! (I will discuss the comment about not wanting to "end up on the short side" in a future post because that is extremely suggestive of what really happened).
[Note: As reader KM points out in the comments:
Assume for a moment that account is true. If indeed she knew there was a debate about the tubes but didn't know what its "nature" was (a typically shifty/ambiguous statement, but no matter -- every possible interpretation is equally damning), then the conclusion is unassailable: she had no basis whatsoever for, and was in absolutely no position to make, her statement about the tubes only really being suited for centrifuge programmes. Moreover, by making her public statement while well aware (as her spin logically entails) that she was unqualified to do so, she would have been acting, by her own admission, in a patently dishonest and unethical fashion.]
Likewise, George Tenet's statement to the SSCI (emphasis mine):
Although the IC had been debating this issue for almost a year and a half, the DCI testified at a Committee hearing that he was unaware of the debate until mid-September of 2002.
...was quite simply a lie. His job as the head of the CIA involved reading intelligence reports put out by the CIA (and other agencies). To claim that he was not aware of the debate required him to have not read the CIA's own intel reports which were meant for the White House (that he answered to). This is impossible. After all, even Condoleezza Rice ostensibly admitted being aware of "some debate" prior to her September 8, 2002 claim!
UPDATE: Let's wrap up this post with this passage from the NYT article (emphasis mine):
The Senate report provides only a partial picture of the agency's communications with the White House. In an arrangement endorsed by both parties, the Intelligence Committee agreed to delay an examination of whether White House descriptions of Iraq's military capabilities were ''substantiated by intelligence information.'' As a result, Senate investigators were not permitted to interview White House officials about what they knew of the tubes debate and when they knew it.
But in interviews, C.I.A. and administration officials disclosed that the dissenting views were repeatedly discussed in meetings and telephone calls.
One senior official at the agency said its ''fundamental approach'' was to tell policy makers about dissenting views. Another senior official acknowledged that some of their agency's reports ''weren't as well caveated as, in retrospect, they should have been.'' But he added, ''There was certainly nothing that was hidden.''
Four agency officials insisted that Winpac analysts repeatedly explained the contrasting assessments during briefings with senior National Security Council officials who dealt with nuclear proliferation issues. ''We think we were reasonably clear about this,'' a senior C.I.A. official said.
A senior administration official confirmed that Winpac was indeed candid about the differing views. The official, who recalled at least a half dozen C.I.A. briefings on tubes, said he knew by late 2001 that there were differing views on the tubes. ''To the best of my knowledge, he never hid anything from me,'' the official said of his counterpart at Winpac.
This official said he also spoke to senior officials at the Department of Energy about the tubes, and a spokeswoman for the department said in a written statement that the agency ''strongly conveyed its viewpoint to senior policy makers.''
That's the truth.