Uranium from Africa and the Butler Report: The Alleged French Connection
by eriposte
In the context of the uranium from Africa hoax, I had examined the British Butler Report at great length in previous posts and consolidated the bulk of the analysis in a summary post. However, I was recently copied on some email correspondence between Bob Fertik of Democrats.com and Michael Smith of the Times of London (the reporter who broke the story of the Downing Street Memos), discussing the British uranium claim. Through that correspondence and in a subsequent email exchange with Michael, I became aware of his Nov. 6, 2005 article in the Times (U.K.) that reported, among other things, that:
(a) the previously hidden evidence that the British used to justify their uranium claim came from French intelligence (DGSE),
(b) the French did not (initially) reveal this intelligence to the CIA, and
(c) both the French and the British stand by this claim even today.
I thought it is therefore desirable to analyze Smith's article to assess whether the alleged French connection and accompanying "evidence" from the British Government pass even moderate scrutiny. The short answer is that it totally, completely does not and only exposes the British Government's ever changing story to be an even bigger pack of lies than it already was. In short, if the evidence described in Smith's report is really the basis of the still-standing British uranium claim, let's just say that Tony Blair is going to be in worse trouble than he already is.
Keeping with the main points mentioned in Smith's Times article, I will segment my discussion into the following sections.
1. The Alleged French Connection (Key Details from Smith's article)
2. The Wissam Al-Zahawi visit to Niger in 1999
3. Why the British assessed the Al-Zahawi/uranium link to be credible
4. The Joseph Wilson trip to Niger in 2002
5. The French standing by their claim
6. The British standing by their claim
7. Conclusions
1. The Alleged French Connection (Key Details from Smith's article)
Smith mentions several pieces of information in his article pertaining to some of the history of the uranium from Africa claim. So, in this section I merely consolidate the pertinent extracts from his article (all emphasis is mine):
THERE was no hint in the few small pieces of intelligence that came into the MI6 headquarters at Vauxhall Cross, London, in February 1999 of what was to follow. There was certainly no indication that nearly seven years later they might rock America.
...
The information that reached London in 1999 came from MI6’s French counterpart, the DGSE. It arose from a visit made by Wissam al-Zahawie, an Iraqi diplomat, to Niger, the former French colony in west Africa. According to the DGSE, he was alleged to have asked President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara of Niger to supply Baghdad with the semi- processed uranium ore known as yellowcake.The French had a finger in every pie in their former colony and their atomic energy commission controlled its uranium mines. They knew that Niger had provided Iraq with uranium in the 1980s.
It was only two months after UN weapons inspectors had left Iraq and both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime. So MI6 saw the intelligence as entirely credible. There were other reports that backed it up, including intercepted Iraqi communications, but only the French intelligence was conclusive.
...
The DGSE began an intelligence operation to block Saddam from obtaining uranium, urging its agents to find out all they could about his efforts. One of those who got involved was Rocco Martino, a former police officer who had worked for the Italian intelligence service between 1976 and 1985, when he was sacked for being a “chancer”. He tapped up contacts at the Niger embassy in Rome.The French did not at the time pass their information to the CIA. Under the rules that govern intelligence exchange, MI6 could not do so without French permission, although it did pass on its own less conclusive evidence.
...
In February 2002, however, the Italians provided more details. Niger had allegedly signed a deal in 2000 to sell Iraq 500 tons of yellowcake. This was again circulated by the CIA to top American officials.Anxious to make the case for war against Iraq, which was under fierce debate within the administration, Cheney wanted to know more.
Unable to provide further information, the CIA asked Joseph Wilson, a former ambassador, to go to Niger to investigate. In his own words, he “spent the next eight days drinking mint tea with dozens of people” who all assured him that there was no deal to supply Iraq with yellowcake. However, they left open the possibility that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain it.
At the time his visit was not seen as significant. A number of US officials pointed out that even if there had been a deal, there was not much chance of anyone admitting it to Wilson.
The yellowcake made its next appearance in September 2002 in the British dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which said that “there is intelligence that Iraq has sought significant quantities of uranium from Niger”.
Martino then re-entered the picture. In October 2002 he presented the DGSE with documents which appeared to show that Niger had signed a deal in July 2000 to supply Iraq with yellowcake — similar to the story Italian intelligence had told the CIA. The DGSE rejected the documents as fake.
Martino offered them for €15,000 to a journalist working on Panorama, the Italian magazine, who took them to the US embassy in Rome for authentication. Copies were sent to Washington. Then, a few weeks later, on November 22, the French opened up. They told the Americans about their original 1999 intelligence and said they were now certain that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain yellowcake.
...
He used what have become infamous in America as “the 16 words”: “The British government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”Six days later, in response to an IAEA request for evidence of Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium, the United States handed over the Martino documents. But in March, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, the IAEA told the UN security council that the documents were fakes.
Shaken, the CIA eventually withdrew any suggestion that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger.
...
The DGSE, meanwhile, is standing by its original intelligence that in early 1999, Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger. So is MI6, despite having ditched every other contentious report that it made on Iraqi WMD.
The next few sections analyze these key claims.
2. The Wissam Al-Zahawi visit to Niger in 1999
Smith's article says the following (emphasis mine):
THERE was no hint in the few small pieces of intelligence that came into the MI6 headquarters at Vauxhall Cross, London, in February 1999 of what was to follow. There was certainly no indication that nearly seven years later they might rock America.
...
The information that reached London in 1999 came from MI6’s French counterpart, the DGSE. It arose from a visit made by Wissam al-Zahawie, an Iraqi diplomat, to Niger, the former French colony in west Africa. According to the DGSE, he was alleged to have asked President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara of Niger to supply Baghdad with the semi- processed uranium ore known as yellowcake.
...
The French did not at the time pass their information to the CIA. Under the rules that govern intelligence exchange, MI6 could not do so without French permission, although it did pass on its own less conclusive evidence.
...
In February 2002, however, the Italians provided more details. Niger had allegedly signed a deal in 2000 to sell Iraq 500 tons of yellowcake. This was again circulated by the CIA to top American officials.
...
Then...on November 22, the French opened up. They told the Americans about their original 1999 intelligence and said they were now certain that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain yellowcake.
Smith's sources left out some important details which need to be filled in. It is unclear whether Smith intended this or not, but his article clearly gives the impression that the allegation linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 Niger visit to uranium only came from the French and that the CIA was unaware of it until the French told them about it in late November 2002. In fact, the CIA was very much aware of the (false) allegation that Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 trip was connected to uranium, no later than February 2002 - because the Italians (SISMI) conveyed this charge to them on or before Feb 5, 2002.
Specifically, let me quote the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report on this (emphasis mine):
Reporting on the uranium transaction did not surface again until February 5, 2002 when the CIA's DO issued a second intelligence report [DELETED] which again cited the source as a "[foreign] government service."
...
Several analysts interviewed by Committee staff also pointed out that information in the second intelligence report matched [DELETED] reporting from 1999 which showed that an Algerian businessman, Baraka, was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawi, to visit Niger and other African countries in early February 1999.
I have discussed this aspect in multiple posts previously - for example here, here and here. To summarize, here is what the CIA knew and when they knew it.
- The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002 that they had some reporting from 1999 that Wissam Al-Zahawi visited Niger in 1999. The source of this reporting is redacted in the SSCI Report (was it French? British? Italian? other? intelligence)
- The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002, that SISMI's second report was essentially linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's Feb 1999 visit to Niger to Saddam's seeking uranium from Africa. (The CIA had acknowledged receiving the allegation that Iraq had been seeking uranium from Niger since "at least early 1999" in their very first intel report on October 15, 2001).
- So, whether or not the French passed on their information to the CIA directly is mostly irrelevant because the CIA heard similar allegations from SISMI (more on this in Section 5) and were also provided access to the British claims based on the French intel (more on this in Section 6). Not to mention, according to Smith's article, the CIA did receive the French intel in question on Nov 22, 2002.
3. Why the British assessed the Al-Zahawi/uranium link to be credible
Smith reports the following (all emphasis is mine):
The information that reached London in 1999 came from MI6’s French counterpart, the DGSE. It arose from a visit made by Wissam al-Zahawie, an Iraqi diplomat, to Niger, the former French colony in west Africa. According to the DGSE, he was alleged to have asked President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara of Niger to supply Baghdad with the semi-processed uranium ore known as yellowcake.The French had a finger in every pie in their former colony and their atomic energy commission controlled its uranium mines. They knew that Niger had provided Iraq with uranium in the 1980s.
It was only two months after UN weapons inspectors had left Iraq and both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime. So MI6 saw the intelligence as entirely credible. There were other reports that backed it up, including intercepted Iraqi communications, but only the French intelligence was conclusive.
These observations are in contradiction to what was published in the Butler Report. Let's recap what the Butler Report had to say on why the British judged the uranium claim to be credible (emphasis mine):
503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence was credible.
As I explained in multiple previous posts (example), the Butler Report was referring to the Al-Zahawi visit to Niger in Feb 1999. In my discussion of the Butler Report, I also pointed out several reasons why the Butler Report's statements (above) were deliberately misleading. For instance (emphasis mine):
The reference to Niger's exports conveniently excluded Iraq's exports (oil/petroleum products) which could easily have been a justification for Iraq-Niger contacts.
Indeed, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) which also examined the "uranium from Africa" claim (and found it baseless) said:
Regarding specific allegations of uranium pursuits from Niger, Ja’far claims that after 1998 Iraq had only two contacts with Niamey—neither of which involved uranium. Ja’far acknowledged that Iraq’s Ambassador to the Holy See traveled to Niamey to invite the President of Niger to visit Iraq. He indicated that Baghdad hoped that the Nigerian President would agree to the visit as he had visited Libya despite sanctions being levied on Tripoli. Former Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See Wissam Zahawie has publicly provided a similar account.
- Ja’far claims a second contact between Iraq and Niger occurred when a Nigerian minister visited Baghdad around 2001 to request assistance in obtaining petroleum products to alleviate Niger’s economic problems. During the negotiations for this contract, the Nigerians did not offer any kind of payment or other quid pro quo, including offering to provide Iraq with uranium ore, other than cash in exchange for petroleum.
- ISG recovered a copy of a crude oil contract dated 26 June 2001 that, although unsigned, appears to support this arrangement.
The point of my reproducing the ISG extract is that warmongers and Wilson-bashers made a habit of claiming that buying uranium would have been Iraq's only commercial interest with Niger, even though it was obvious that the real interest could have been to sell oil products to Niger.
More importantly, as mentioned in the above extract, the possibility of oil exports was not the only reason to doubt the British claim. Iraq had made it clear that the 1999 visit was intended to try and weaken the U.N. sanctions by urging other countries to visit Iraq (see here for example). The fact that Iraq was trying for a long time to break the back of the U.N. sanctions was well known and should not have been a "surprise" to anyone (other than, say, the 101st Fighting Keyboarders). Indeed, the fact that Wissam Al-Zahawie, during his 1999 trip to Africa, visited not just Niger but also Burkina Faso, Benin and Congo-Brazzaville, none of which are uranium producers, should have provided additional evidence for the case that his trip to Africa could easily have been for other reasons. By intentionally ignoring this, the Butler Report demonstrated a deliberate intent to mislead the British public.
Let's use that background to assess what Smith's article says.
First, the Butler Report claims that "British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium". In contrast, Smith's article says that the British found only the French intelligence reporting on this to be "credible" and "conclusive". If Smith's article is accurate, this would mean that the Butler Report was misleading readers about the number of supposedly credible sources for the British claim. (Of course, I have previously shown that the Butler Report was indeed deliberately misleading on this very point - and the British Government's garbage was uncritically spread by even good newspapers like the Financial Times).
Second, the Butler Report asserts that the basis of the British assessment of the credibility of the uranium claim was the fact that Niger's major export was uranium. That was also deliberately misleading (as discussed above), but Smith's article suggests that the British based their assessment of the credibility of the Zahawi/uranium link on the fact that "both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime". This is a new justification. If true, it actually undercuts the credibility of their claim because Saddam was always intent on breaking the sanctions regime (after all that was the background of the Zahawi visit to the multiple African nations in 1999, three of whom were not uranium producers). Just because he was intent on breaking the back of the U.N. sanctions does not credibly prove that he was seeking uranium from Africa. (It is like saying that Saddam had nuclear weapons because we know that he was intent on breaking sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons). Stated differently, the only credible proof for Saddam seeking uranium in Africa would be reports that actually showed him seeking uranium from Africa. [In short: Using a specific motive to assess guilt could be considered reasonable only if credible alternative motives did not exist, which was not the case here.]
4. The Joseph Wilson trip to Niger in 2002
Smith says (emphasis mine):
Anxious to make the case for war against Iraq, which was under fierce debate within the administration, Cheney wanted to know more.
Unable to provide further information, the CIA asked Joseph Wilson, a former ambassador, to go to Niger to investigate. In his own words, he “spent the next eight days drinking mint tea with dozens of people” who all assured him that there was no deal to supply Iraq with yellowcake. However, they left open the possibility that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain it.
At the time his visit was not seen as significant. A number of US officials pointed out that even if there had been a deal, there was not much chance of anyone admitting it to Wilson.
There are multiple problems with this narrative.
First of all, Wilson's trip provided no credible evidence that Iraqis tried to seek uranium from Niger (the fact that the CIA themselves withdrew the uranium claim after the IAEA reported that the Niger documents were forged and did not use Wilson's trip to prop up their claim, is one of several pieces of evidence that makes this clear). Even the most Bush-administration-friendly reading of Wilson's trip only established that some businessman who claimed to represent Iraqis allegedly told a former Nigerien official (Ibrahim Mayaki) that an Iraqi delegation was interested in discussing "trade" and that Mayaki speculated that this businessman might have been referring to uranium. There are more holes in this story than Swiss cheese - and I would refer readers to this summary post on Wilson's trip to see why his trip was actually unfavorable to the claim that Saddam sought uranium from Africa (Niger). Moreover, as I explained in detail in my previous posts:
Even if the (fictitious) Niger and Iraq-"trade"-delegation meeting had occurred in Niger, the narrative about Mayaki "steering" discussions away from "trade" ("uranium") defied even threadbare logic and totally lacked any credibility. In other words, only in the Orwellian world of George W. Bush and his neocons would a delegation that came all the way at great cost and secrecy to discuss trade/uranium, return back to their home country without even bringing up the matter of "trade" let alone "uranium", simply because their host had the gift of steering conversations to topics (other than "trade") that the delegation never came there to discuss.
...
Is it not astounding that a series of events, some possibly realistic, some implausible, in which not a single Iraqi is shown to have even uttered the word "uranium" (or to have mentioned "uranium" in any document) were somehow considered as supportive of the premise that Iraq was recently seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa?
Second, the issue is not whether Saddam may have possibly tried to seek uranium from Niger (as Smith says: "[Nigeriens] left open the possibility that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain it."). It was whether he had, in fact, sought significant quantitites of uranium from Niger. This is a very important distinction that the SSCI Report deliberately blurred and thereby misled readers on the fact that making claims using possibilities is not the same as making claims using credible evidence (i.e., "anything is possible but that doesn't mean anything actually happened"). In my previous discussion of this nonsense in the Senate Report I said:
Let's begin with a key conclusion of the report from page 125 (and as I've mentioned at the top of this post, all emphasis is mine):
The Committee did not find that the information showed Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure uranium" as indicated in the NIE, but it did indicate that Iraq may have been trying to acquire uranium.
Note the emphasis on the word may. To put it bluntly, Iraq may have been trying to send a man to the moon too, but that doesn't mean we know for a fact that they were trying to send a man to the moon.
The Senate report's conclusion is a dramatically different statement based on the same intelligence used by the Bush administration to claim that Saddam's alleged attempt(s) to seek uranium from Africa was a certainty. In reality, there was no certainty, there was a lot of incredulity and doubt - yet the Bush administration portrayed the claim as being 100% certain. Taking this observation from the Senate Report, along with the realities of the Butler Report and the ISG Report, we can say this for starters:
Anyone who claims that the Senate (SSCI) report vindicated the claim that Saddam was in fact seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa, is spouting something that is demonstrably false
Another conclusion in the Senate Report makes it clear that the claim that Saddam Hussein was seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa was not supported by the facts.
Conclusion 16. The language in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" overstated what the Intelligence Community knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts. [page 75]
Again, note the use of the word "possible". No certainty (even on "trying to procure", let alone actually procuring) -- lots of doubt.
Third, Wilson's trip most definitely found no evidence for the specific claims that were the basis of his trip in the first place! I have noted this previously in the context of all that was known after Wilson's trip:
11. The complete lack of corroboration of the two Niger uranium intel reports that were received by the CIA prior to Joseph Wilson's trip.
Recall that the intel reports alleged that the Feb 1999 visit of Al-Zahawie had to do with seeking uranium - something that no Nigerien official claimed during Wilson's trip and Wilson found no evidence for.
The intel reports also alleged that a sale had been concluded by Niger to sell massive quantities of uranium to Iraq - again, Wilson found no evidence whatsoever for this.
Finally, Smith's article says that "A number of US officials pointed out that even if there had been a deal, there was not much chance of anyone admitting it to Wilson". This may be technically correct but the position expressed by these officials was misleading. For instance, Iran was also on the U.S. nuclear watchlist but a Nigerien official freely admitted that Iran had approached Niger for purchasing uranium. As I pointed out sometime ago the CIA was conveniently claiming to believe a former Nigerien official who never said that anyone ever mentioned uranium to him in the context of Iraq (Mayaki), while ignoring another former senior Nigerien official who was categorical about Iraq not having approached Niger for uranium while admitting that Iran had:
The assurance received from another former senior Nigerien official (Mai Manga) that Iran (another "axis-of-evil" member) had recently sought uranium from Niger, but Iraq had most certainly not (this is significant since the words of a different Nigerien official -Mayaki - that seemed to support the Iraq uranium claim were conveniently being trusted by Wilson's critics, even though Mayaki's statements actually did not support that claim at all, as I have discussed above).
5. The French standing by their claim
Smith's article discusses the French intel and their claims (emphasis mine):
THERE was no hint in the few small pieces of intelligence that came into the MI6 headquarters at Vauxhall Cross, London, in February 1999 of what was to follow. There was certainly no indication that nearly seven years later they might rock America.
...
The information that reached London in 1999 came from MI6’s French counterpart, the DGSE. It arose from a visit made by Wissam al-Zahawie, an Iraqi diplomat, to Niger, the former French colony in west Africa. According to the DGSE, he was alleged to have asked President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara of Niger to supply Baghdad with the semi- processed uranium ore known as yellowcake.
...
It was only two months after UN weapons inspectors had left Iraq and both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime. So MI6 saw the intelligence as entirely credible. There were other reports that backed it up, including intercepted Iraqi communications, but only the French intelligence was conclusive.
...
The French did not at the time pass their information to the CIA. Under the rules that govern intelligence exchange, MI6 could not do so without French permission, although it did pass on its own less conclusive evidence.
...
The yellowcake made its next appearance in September 2002 in the British dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which said that “there is intelligence that Iraq has sought significant quantities of uranium from Niger”.[Rocco] Martino then re-entered the picture. In October 2002 he presented the DGSE with documents which appeared to show that Niger had signed a deal in July 2000 to supply Iraq with yellowcake — similar to the story Italian intelligence had told the CIA. The DGSE rejected the documents as fake.
Martino offered them for €15,000 to a journalist working on Panorama, the Italian magazine, who took them to the US embassy in Rome for authentication. Copies were sent to Washington. Then, a few weeks later, on November 22, the French opened up. They told the Americans about their original 1999 intelligence and said they were now certain that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain yellowcake.
...
He used what have become infamous in America as “the 16 words”: “The British government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”Six days later, in response to an IAEA request for evidence of Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium, the United States handed over the Martino documents. But in March, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, the IAEA told the UN security council that the documents were fakes.
Shaken, the CIA eventually withdrew any suggestion that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger.
...
The DGSE, meanwhile, is standing by its original intelligence that in early 1999, Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger. So is MI6, despite having ditched every other contentious report that it made on Iraqi WMD.
There are serious problems with this narrative - especially the assertions by DGSE that they stand by their 1999 intel even today, and that this intel is separate from what was contained in the Niger forgeries (which I derive from the claim that they received the forgeries from Rocco Martino in October 2002 and dismissed them as fakes). Both of these assertions contradict the facts reported in the Senate (SSCI) Report. (NOTE: As of now, I am not even introducing into the discussion the fact that the former Vice-Director of DGSE, Alain Choulet has claimed categorically to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica that the French in fact even alerted the U.S. about the bogus nature of the Niger documents in summer 2002).
I discussed the November 2002 French intel claim in a previous post, as part of my detailed series examining every single claim on the uranium hoax in the SSCI report. Let's recall what I pointed out then (emphasis mine):
The Senate Report says:
On November 22, 2002, during a meeting with State Department officials, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation said that France had information on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. He said that France had determined that no uranium had been shipped, but France believed the reporting was true that Iraq had made a procurement attempt for uranium from Niger. [page 59]
Analysis
Another independent corroborating source, you say? Oops.
On March 4, 2003, the U.S. Government learned that the French had based their initial assessment that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger on the same documents that the U.S. had provided to the INVO [IAEA]. [page 69]
In other words, on (or before) March 4, 2003, the French had told the U.S. Government that the intel they communicated to the U.S. on November 22, 2002, was based ultimately on the contents of the forged Niger dossier.
Now, let's read Smith's article on this point once again:
...on November 22, the French opened up. They told the Americans about their original 1999 intelligence and said they were now certain that Iraq had tried and failed to obtain yellowcake.
...
The DGSE, meanwhile, is standing by its original intelligence that in early 1999, Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger.
Clearly, DGSE's claim is in direct contradiction to what the French told the U.S. Government, as stated in the Senate (SSCI) Report.
Let's also reiterate what I've harped on repeatedly for months now. The alleged link between Al-Zahawi's trip and uranium was in one of the forged Niger documents. That was Doc 2 and I discussed that particular document previously along with the accompanying, likely authentic document (Doc 1) about Al-Zahawi's planned visit (which does not mention uranium). Further, as I said then, although I am not yet 100% certain that it was specifically Doc 2 that was the basis of the SISMI report to the CIA in February 2002, it is likely that it was. My point is that any assertion that the Al-Zahawi/uranium link was independent of the Niger forgeries would be a misleading statement at the minimum.
Moreover, even if we assume hypothetically that the intel shared by the French was "new" to the CIA (it wasn't, as I showed in Section 2), the fact remains that the CIA did not stand by their uranium claim in their National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] despite being informed of the French "intel" (see this post for a discussion on that) and did not consider the British claim trustworthy either (see Section 6.2).
6. The British standing by their claim
In Smith's article, the claims of the British Government vis-a-vis the French intel is so full of holes that, for starters, I should refer readers to the previous section and my thorough review of the Butler Report. For simplicity I will paraphrase what Smith reports the British as claiming and comment on why those claims don't stand up to scrutiny.
6.1 CLAIM: Information from the French (DGSE) linking the 1999 Al-Zahawi visit to uranium came to the British in 1999 and this was the basis of their Saddam/uranium claim
This is false, because this was contradicted by the British themselves in their own Parliamentary Reports based on sworn testimony. The British said, in the Taylor Parliamentary Report, that the intel for the uranium claim in their Sep 2002 dossier:
...came from two independent sources, one of which was based on documentary evidence. One had reported in June 2002 and the other in September [2002] that the Iraqis had expressed interest in purchasing, as it had done before, uranium from Niger. GCHQ also had some sigint concerning a visit by an Iraqi official to Niger. [emphasis mine]
It is possible that the signals intelligence (sigint) that GCHQ was referring to was the DGSE report in 1999, but the sigint evidently only mentioned the Al-Zahawi trip - not that the trip had to do with uranium. This is consistent with what the CIA's February 2002 intel report mentioned - namely, that there was evidence from 1999 that Al-Zahawi had made a trip to Niger that year. However, the Taylor Report made it abundantly clear that the actual evidence for Saddam Hussein seeking uranium from Africa (Niger) came from reports in June 2002 and September 2002. So, even if there was alleged evidence prior to these dates about an Al-Zahawi/uranium link (e.g., see Butler Report page 122, sec. 493), we can conclude from the Taylor Report that the British did not consider such evidence to be credible enough to support their claim.
There's another aspect to the British claim based on what the Butler Report said (emphasis mine):
495. During 2002, the UK received further intelligence from additional sources which identified the purpose of the visit to Niger as having been to negotiate the purchase of uranium ore, though there was disagreement as to whether a sale had been agreed and uranium shipped. [page 122]
A reasonable interpretation of the term "additional sources" is that any sources reporting prior to 2002 were different from these "additional sources". So, if the British received the uranium intel from the French (DGSE) prior to 2002, then it was not considered credible by them (as inferred from the Taylor Report). On the other hand if the British received the French intel in 2002, then the claim that the DGSE report received in 1999 was the basis of their uranium claim is false.
[NOTE: The Butler Report's statement above masks the deliberate bamboozling by the British Government on the issue of whether Saddam had allegedly attempted to purchase uranium ("sought") or had actually completed a sale with Niger ("bought"). This is a very significant matter that undercut their entire claim, as I've discussed in a previous post.]
6.2 CLAIM: The claim in the British Dossier is still valid because the French DGSE report is credible and was not (initially) shared with the CIA
This is false for multiple reasons (not just the ones mentioned in Section 6.1 above).
For example, even if the French had not actually shared their intel with the CIA prior to the British Dossier being published, they did share it with the US in November 2002 and later acknowledged (on or before March 4, 2003) that their intel was based on information in the Niger forgeries (see Section 5). That would invalidate any assertion that the claim is still worth "standing by".
Second, even if the French had not actually shared their intel with the CIA prior to the British Dossier being published, the CIA was aware of intel attempting to link Al-Zahawi and uranium on or before February 5, 2002 (see Section 2). They were also aware of the contents of the British dossier and had specifically repudiated the claims in the dossier at that time - as lacking credibility. So, it matters not that the CIA may not have received anything specifically from DGSE because the British White Paper's claim based on the DGSE intel was deemed to not be trustworthy by the CIA.
Third, as I have discussed at length in my review of the Butler Report, the overwhelming evidence on the British uranium claim not only shows a systematic pattern of mendacity by senior British officials about their claim but points quite strongly to the conclusion that the British "evidence" is ultimately traceable to the Niger forgeries. Indeed, if all that the British had to sustain their claim was the intel that the French provided to the US on November 22, 2002, then it is an obvious conclusion that that intel was based on the forged Niger documents (see Section 5)!
Let me also recap here some of the pertinent observations on the ever-changing British claims by British Labor MP Lynne Jones - most of which were deliberately ignored in the Butler Report [I've reproduced the text of her comments but removed the original formatting so that I can add my own emphasis. Please go to Jones' website to see the original formatting]:
4.40. On 31 March 2003, Mike O’Brien MP, Under Secretary of State at the FCO answered a Parliamentary Question from Chris Mullin MP (now himself a Foreign Office Minister) stating that the UK Government continued to have confidence that the ‘uranium claim’ was backed up by a ‘variety of sources’.[34] This is contradicted by the ISC Report which tells us that the Government only had two sources, one of which was under consideration in the light of the knowledge of forgery of documents.
4.41. On 1 September an answer by Bill Rammell MP, Under Secretary of State at the FCO, stated that the intelligence upon which the UK Government relied came from ‘the intelligence service of another Government’[35]. In correspondence with Lynne Jones MP (attached as Appendix 1) in a letter dated 23 September 2003, the Prime Minister also reiterated that the intelligence did not come from the UK but from another country. This contradicted remarks of 27 June 2003 by Alistair Campbell, then Director of Communications for 10 Downing Street and responsible to the Prime Minister, who said on Channel 4 News:
“the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence. Get your facts right before you make serious allegations against a government.”[36]
4.42. In correspondence with the Prime Minister, Lynne Jones has requested clarification on this point but clarification has not been provided.
...
4.46. We recommend that the Butler Committee look at all Parliamentary Questions the UK Government have answered by reference to the Butler Review and investigate the issues raised.4.47. In a letter to Lynne Jones MP dated 23 September 2003, the Prime Minister suggested that the UK Government did not consider the IAEA to be in possession of the intelligence available to the UK:
We have, of course, encouraged all states that have relevant information to pass it to the IAEA in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, and it is disappointing that there remains evidence that has not been made available to them.
4.48. On 30 January 2004, however, this was subsequently contradicted by Jack Straw, when he revealed [38] that it was the UK Government’s understanding that the intelligence upon which the UK relied was discussed by the originators with the IAEA before the Agency concluded the allegations were unfounded. Lynne Jones contacted the IAEA on 19 May 2004 to ask whether a ‘third party’ discussed or showed evidence with the IAEA and what assessment the IAEA made of any such discussion/evidence. On 25 May 2004, Mark Gwozdecky, Spokesperson and Director Division of Public Information (MTPI) of the IAEA responded as follows:
I can confirm to you that we have received information from a number of member states regarding the allegation that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Niger. However, we have learned nothing which would cause us to change the conclusion we reported to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003 with regards to the documents assessed to be forgeries and have not received any information that would appear to be based on anything other than those documents.
4.49. We recommend that the Butler Committee invite the IAEA to make available to them all the information they have received on the uranium claim.
4.50. On 7 June 2004, Lynne Jones tabled a parliamentary question asking what the basis is for the Foreign Secretary’s understanding that the intelligence upon which the UK Government based its claim was discussed by the originators with the IAEA. The Government’s response was that they were withholding details of intelligence exchanges with allies under Exemption 1 (c) of Part 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.[39] If, as Jack Straw indicates, the originators of the intelligence upon which the UK Government based its claim did discuss their intelligence with the IAEA before 7 March 2003, the evidence upon which the UK Government relied did not cause the IAEA to change their conclusion that these allegations were unfounded.
4.51. The Iraq Survey Group has not been able to verify the UK Government’s claim. On the contrary, in the January 26 2004 edition of the New York Times, Dr. David Kay, who resigned as head of the ISG said his team had uncovered no evidence that Niger had tried to sell uranium to Iraq for a nuclear weapons program (see press Annex, page 91).
4.52. In light of Jack Straw’s statement in a Parliamentary answer, that the UK Government understands the intelligence upon which they relied was discussed with the IAEA before the Agency reported the fake intelligence in March 2003, we recommend that the Butler Committee compares any information supplied by the IAEA with the primary intelligence source upon which the UK relied, ask whether it is reasonable for the UK to continue to stand by the claim and considers whether amendments should have been made to the assessment in the 24 September 2002 Dossier.
7. Conclusions
In this post I analyzed a recent report by Michael Smith in the London Times that states that the "other evidence" that the British Government has been holding back all these years to justify their uranium from Africa claim is traceable to the French intelligence agency, DGSE. The report also states, among other things, that the French did not (initially) reveal this intelligence to the CIA, and that both the French and the British stand by this claim even today.
I have demonstrated systematically that this story (offered by Smith's sources) is completely bunk and contradicts many of the facts on record in multiple parliamentary/congressional reports (SSCI Report, Taylor Report, Butler Report) based on sworn testimony by U.S. and British Government officials.
Let me recap the main findings in this post.
1. It is unclear whether Smith intended this or not, but his article clearly gives the impression that the allegation linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 Niger visit to uranium only came from the French and that the CIA was unaware of it until the French told them about it in late November 2002. In fact, the CIA was very much aware of the (false) allegation that Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 trip was connected to uranium, no later than February 2002 - because the Italians (SISMI) conveyed this charge to them on or before Feb 5, 2002. Moreover:
- The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002 that they had some reporting from 1999 that Wissam Al-Zahawi visited Niger in 1999
- The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002, that SISMI's second report was essentially linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's Feb 1999 visit to Niger to Saddam's seeking uranium from Africa. (The CIA had acknowledged receiving the allegation that Iraq had been seeking uranium from Niger since "at least early 1999" in their very first intel report on October 15, 2001).
- So, whether or not the French passed on their information to the CIA directly is mostly irrelevant because the CIA heard similar allegations from SISMI (more on this in Section 5) and were also provided access to the British claims based on the French intel (more on this in Section 6). Not to mention, according to Smith's article, the CIA did receive the French intel in question on Nov 22, 2002.
2. The Butler Report claims that "British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium". In contrast, Smith's article says that the British found only the French intelligence reporting on this to be "credible" and "conclusive". If Smith's article is accurate, this would mean that the Butler Report was misleading readers about the number of supposedly credible sources for the British claim. (Of course, I have previously shown that the Butler Report was indeed deliberately misleading on this very point).
3. The Butler Report asserts that the basis of the British assessment of the credibility of the uranium claim was the fact that Niger's major export was uranium. That was deliberately misleading in itself (as discussed in Section 3), but Smith's article suggests that the British based their assessment of the credibility of the Zahawi/uranium link on the fact that "both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime". This is a new justification. If true, it actually undercuts the credibility of their claim because Saddam was always intent on breaking the sanctions regime (after all that was the background of the Zahawi visit to the multiple African nations in 1999, three of whom were not uranium producers). Just because he was intent on breaking the back of the U.N. sanctions does not credibly prove that he was seeking uranium from Africa. (It is like saying that Saddam had nuclear weapons because we know that he was intent on breaking sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons). Stated differently, the only credible proof for Saddam seeking uranium in Africa would be reports that actually showed him seeking uranium from Africa. [In short: Using a specific motive to assess guilt could be considered reasonable only if credible alternative motives did not exist, which was not the case here.]
4. Smith's article captures some observations regarding the findings of Joseph Wilson that reflect the position of some in the Bush administration. However, the narrative offered is incomplete and is contradicted by the facts surrounding Wilson's trip.
5. There are serious problems with the assertions by DGSE that they stand by their 1999 intel even today, and that this intel is separate from what was contained in the Niger forgeries. Both of these assertions contradict the facts reported in the Senate (SSCI) Report. (NOTE: As of now, I am not even introducing into the discussion the fact that the former Vice-Director of DGSE, Alain Choulet has claimed categorically to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica that the French in fact even alerted the U.S. about the bogus nature of the Niger documents in summer 2002). Moreover, even if we assume hypothetically that the intel shared by the French was "new" to the CIA (it wasn't, as I showed in Section 2), the fact remains that the CIA did not stand by their uranium claim in their National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] despite being informed of the French "intel" (see this post for a discussion on that) and did not consider the British claim trustworthy either (see Section 6.2).
6. The claims from Smith's British Government sources that:
(a)
information from the French (DGSE) linking the 1999 Al-Zahawi visit to uranium came to the British in 1999 and this was the basis of their Saddam/uranium claim, and
(b) the claim in the British Dossier is still valid because the French DGSE report is credible and was not (initially) shared with the CIA
...are both shown to be categorically false based on the facts established by the British Taylor and Butler Reports and the U.S. SSCI Report, as well as additional information in the public record.