Thursday :: Dec 22, 2005

WMDgate: A Reader Submission

by eriposte

A reader, who prefers to be known as FMJ, sent me a (long) write-up focusing on one of the most suspicious aspects of the intelligence fixing associated with the aluminum tubes. What I am referring to is this paragraph in the Senate (SSCI) Report discussion on the tubes (emphasis mine):

Contributing to the CIA's analysis for the extensive September intelligence assessment was an analysis performed by an individual from [DELETED] who were working under contract with the CIA at the time to provide broad-based technical advice [DELETED]. The CIA WINPAC analyst, [DELETED], requested in September 2002 that they perform an analysis of the tubes. [SENTENCE DELETED]

[DELETED] The contractors told Committee staff that the CIA provided them with a stack of intelligence data and analysis on the Iraqi aluminum tube procurements on September 16, 2002. All of the information was provided by the CIA and the contractors told Committee staff that they did not discuss the data with any agencies other than the CIA. They were provided with NGIC's analysis of the tubes, but said they were not briefed by nor did they ask to speak to NGIC or DOE analysts. One contractor said, "This was internal to the agency." One of the contractors said before joining [DELETED] he had been given a tutorial on 81-mm rockets by a DOE analyst, but said that the conversation was "pretty meaningless to me because the rest of the issue had not bubbled up at that point." A DOE analyst told Committee staff that he also discussed the issue with the contractor in May of 2001. The contractor produced a paper on September 17, 2002, one day after receiving the information, that said the team concluded, "that the tubes are consistent with design requirements of gas centrifuge rotors, but due to the high-strength material and excessively tight tolerances, the tubes seem inconsistent with design requirements of rocket motor casings."

So, there was a contractor (a "red team" as the Robb-Silberman report called them), whose name the SSCI Report thought important to block out, who produced in exactly 1 day a detailed report that magically agreed with the CIA WINPAC analyst's (Joe's) fabrications conclusions on the aluminum tubes. This incident is one of the most interesting in the context of the tubes and the identity of the contractor is certainly of great interest to me.

Anyway, FMJ has written up a detailed essay titled "Red Team: How Aluminum Tubes were Fixed Around Policy" that analyzes the background of what happened here (as documented in the SSCI and R-S reports) and concludes that:

A red team fixed the aluminum tubes around the policy of pre-emptive war with Iraq...The red team was brought in to assume what it was supposed to prove: that Saddam had an active gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program. The red teams analysis became the basis of the WINPAC paper that became the basis of the tubes majority position in the October NIE. The fix was in.

Many representatives and senators have stated publicly that fear of a nuclear armed Iraq was the determining factor in their yea vote. How many would have voted for the resolution if theyd known the NIEs nuclear section had been based on the work of a red team? How many even know what a red team is?

P.S. Note that I cannot take ownership or responsibility for the information in the essay. I am providing it as-is as part of the TLC document collection, for readers who may have an interest in the matter.

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