Uranium from Africa: How "Bought" Became "Sought" - Part 2-1: U.S. uranium reports in October 2001

by eriposte

This is the next part of a series (see Introduction, Part 1, Part 2) examining the origins of the "bought" v. "sought" semantics of the uranium from Africa allegation. There are two key questions that I try to answer in Part 2 and its sub-parts:

(a) Was the US IC describing "intel" alleging a uranium purchase as "intel" pointing to an attempt to purchase (seek) uranium?

(b) Did the intelligence cited by the U.S. IC on uranium and Niger, prior to the IC's receipt of the Niger forgeries, support the claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger?

This post focuses on known U.S. IC reporting from October 2001 described in the SSCI Report. (Note that all emphasis in quoted portions is mine).

1. October 15, 2001

Let's start with the CIA's first Niger uranium intel report dated 10/15/01 (page 36 of the SSCI Report):

Reporting on a possible uranium yellowcake [5] sales agreement between Niger and Iraq first came to the attention of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) on October 15, 2001. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Operations (DO) issued an intelligence report [DELETED] from a foreign government service indicating that Niger planned to ship several tons of uranium to Iraq [DELETED]. The intelligence report said the uranium sales agreement had been in negotiation between the two countries since at least early 1999, and was approved by the State Court of Niger in late 2000. According to the cable, Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja gave his stamp of approval for the agreement and communicated his decision to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The report also indicated that in October 2000 Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs Nassirou Sabo informed one of his ambassadors in Europe that Niger had concluded an accord to provide several tons of uranium to Iraq. [SENTENCE DELETED]

As you read the above claims, it becomes obvious that the 10/15/01 CIA intelligence report was explicitly discussing "intel" that claimed Saddam Hussein had purchased or bought uranium from Niger (not intel that claimed he had only sought uranium). So, the October 15, 2001 intel report cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.

2. October 18, 2001

Here's the relevant portion of the CIA's 10/18/01 report (pages 36-37 of the SSCI Report):

(U) Only the CIA wrote a finished intelligence product on the report (Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [SEIB], Iraq: Nuclear-Related Procurement Efforts, October 18, 2001). Regarding the Niger reporting the SEIB said:

According to a foreign government service, Niger as of early this year planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq under an agreement concluded late last year. Iraq and Niger had been negotiating the shipment since at least early 1999, but the state court of Niger only this year approved it, according to the service.

- There is no corroboration from other sources that such an agreement was reached or that uranium was transferred.

- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687 prohibits Iraq from purchasing uranium, although the transfer would not require the application of safeguards.

In view of the origin, the uranium probably is in the form of yellowcake and will need further processing to be used in an uranium enrichment plant. Iraq has no known facilities for processing or enriching the material.

- The quantity of yellowcake to be transferred could support the enrichment of enough uranium for at least one nuclear weapon.

Even a cursory reading of the above statements makes it clear that the CIA was explicitly discussing an allegation that Iraq had purchased or bought uranium from Niger - not that Iraq had only sought uranium.

The phrase "early this year planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq" and the phrase "quantity of yellowcake to be transferred" both mean that uranium had allegedly been purchased - if not, there was no need to plan a shipment or a transfer. This aspect becomes more obvious with the added qualifier "under an agreement concluded late last year" which specifically indicates a uranium purchase/sale.

The phrase "Iraq and Niger had been negotiating the shipment since at least early 1999" again talks about a shipment, which implies an actual purchase deal. More importantly, this statement was qualified with the statement that "the state court of Niger only this year approved it". Thus, if someone wanted to interpret the first part of the sentence "Iraq and Niger had been negotiating the shipment since at least early 1999" as implying only that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger in 1999, this interpretation would be wrong because, among other things, the accompanying statement about the Niger State Court approval in 2000 clearly indicated that the approved 2000 uranium deal was based on negotiations on the deal that started in early 1999, i.e., the "intel", if true, claimed that Iraq had sought and bought uranium from Niger. So this intel, could NOT have been used as evidence for a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium, but not bought uranium. In other words, either the intel should be cited in support of a claim that Iraq sought and bought uranium from Niger, or it should not be cited at all since if one (big) part of the claim was considered bunk, there is no grounds to believe the other (remaining) part of the claim, without separate and independent evidence for the other part of the claim.

Thus, the October 18, 2001 CIA intel report, in itself, cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.

P.S. Note that there is a still unexplained discrepancy between the 10/18/01 and 10/15/01 CIA reports. I've discussed that in a previous post.