Uranium from Africa: How "Bought" Became "Sought" - Part 2-4: U.S. uranium reporting in May-September 2002
by eriposte
This is the next part of a series (see Introduction, Part 1, Part 2, Part 2-1, Part 2-2, Part 2-3) examining the origins of the "bought" v. "sought" semantics of the uranium from Africa allegation. There are two key questions that I try to answer in Part 2 and its sub-parts:
(a) Was the US IC describing "intel" alleging a uranium purchase as "intel" pointing to an attempt to purchase (seek) uranium?
(b) Did the intelligence cited by the U.S. IC on uranium and Niger, prior to the IC's receipt of the Niger forgeries, support the claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger?
This part focuses on known U.S. IC reporting from May through September 2002 described in the SSCI Report. This is a time period when the use of proxy phrases like "trying to acquire", "trying to procure", "trying to purchase" and "sought" uranium - in order to specifically describe intel that alleged Iraq had purchased uranium - became commonplace in IC reporting. I discuss the possible motivations of the IC in using this terminology. It is noteworthy that the emergence of the specific word "sought" in the terminology used by the U.S. government - in this case, initiated by the Bush White House on September 24, 2002 - coincided with the British Government's release of their dishonest September 24, 2002 "white paper", in which they adopted the "sought" uranium terminology to describe intel that was about a uranium purchase, starting in mid-September 2002. This was the same "white paper" that the CIA vigorously distanced itself from in the context of the uranium claim (in the Sep/Oct 2002 timeframe).
Let me emphasize here that the semantics of the uranium claim are essentially moot from the standpoint of the CIA which strongly withdrew the uranium claim by no later than Sep/Oct 2002; the semantics are significant only because of the duplicity of the Bush White House's exploitation of the misleading semantics in summer 2003 and beyond to continue to perpetrate the myth that somehow the uranium claim was justifiable because it only alleged Iraq was "seeking" uranium and not that Iraq had purchased uranium. (Note that all emphasis in quoted portions is mine).
1. May 10, 2002
This date is very important, just like the Feb 12, 2002 date. As the SSCI Report points out (page 48):
On May 10, 2002, the CIA's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA) in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) prepared a Principals Committee briefing book updating the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The document noted that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger."
Just like the DIA report of Feb 12, 2002, this CIA NESA report is key to understanding the fundamental semantic underpinnings of the "sought" uranium from Africa hoax.
The CIA NESA report was discussing the previous intel from SISMI alleging that Iraq had already signed a purchase contract for 500 tons of uranium from Niger. Yet, look at the wording in the report:
...foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger.
In other words, the CIA NESA report, just like the Feb 12, 2002 DIA report, was using cautious language in which intel referring to a definitive purchase of uranium from Niger was being described as Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Niger. The phrase "trying to acquire" is of course completely equivalent to the word "sought". This is another example of the U.S. IC using a less definitive term "trying to acquire" (equivalent to "sought") in order to describe intel about a uranium purchase. This makes it obvious that the basis of the allegation that Iraq was trying to procure uranium or that Iraq had sought uranium was really intel that alleged Iraq had purchased uranium. A review of subsequent intel reports (some are discussed below) further confirms this.
Let me add that I don't suspect there was any devious intent in the U.S. IC at the time when this word choice was made. The US IC had significant doubts about the veracity of the uranium purchase allegation and may have wanted to show some degree of skepticism by downplaying the allegation, by referring to it merely as an attempt to purchase uranium - pending confirmation that the purchased uranium had actually been shipped. While their motivations may have been reasonable, the terminology used was misleading because the intel at best claimed that Iraq had sought and bought uranium from Niger. So this intel, could NOT have been used as evidence for a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium, but not bought uranium. Of course, the CIA withdrew the uranium claim no later than the September/October 2002 timeframe (and likely by August) because it was considered bunk, making the semantics moot as far as they were concerned. What they might not have known was the fact that the Bush White House would not only continue to peddle this bunk (aided and abetted by a WINPAC stovepipe), but also deliberately misuse and misrepresent the semantics - by asserting that the statements made by Bush administration officials prior to Colin Powell's UN speech only described an attempt to seek uranium from Niger and not an actual uranium purchase - even after their unacceptable use of the uranium allegation became public in spring/summer 2003. This fiction, that somehow the intel (even that of the British) referred only to Iraq's "seeking" uranium and not to Iraq's "buying" uranium, became one prong of the Bush White House's dishonest, multi-pronged attack on Joseph Wilson, who's trip had, in fact, debunked the claim that Iraq had sought and bought uranium from Niger.
Clearly, this May 10, 2002 CIA NESA report cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
2. July 22, 2002
The SSCI Report notes that (page 48):
(U) On July 22, 2002, the DOE published an intelligence product (Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway?) which highlighted the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal as one of three indications that Iraq might be reconstituting its nuclear program. The report added that there was "no information indicating that any of the uranium shipments arrived in Iraq," and suggested that the "amount of uranium specified far exceeds what Iraq would need even for a robust nuclear weapons program."
As you read the above passage, the context behind the IC's cautionary wording to describe the alleged uranium purchase becomes clearer. They were likely being cautious because they could not confirm that the allegedly purchased uranium had reached Iraq. This may have made it more convenient to describe the intel on Iraq having purchased uranium as something that reflected Iraq having sought uranium. While this may have been a semantic convenience, it cannot be emphasized enough that this was misleading terminology; the actual facts completely undercut the argument that the claim that Iraq was "trying to procure" or "seeking" uranium from Niger was based on intel that was somehow separate from the intel which alleged that Iraq had actually purchased uranium.
For obvious reasons, this July 22, 2002 DOE report cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
3. August 1, 2002
The SSCI Report notes that (page 48):
On August 1, 2002 CIA NESA published a paper on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities which did not include the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium information.
Why did CIA NESA drop the allegation entirely when they had specifically cited it in May 2002? You can click here for the most likely answer.
For obvious reasons, this August 1, 2002 CIA NESA report cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
4. September 2002 (DIA)
Sometime in September 2002, the DIA came out with a report (page 48):
In September 2002, the DIA published an intelligence assessment (Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraqs Reemerging Nuclear Program) which outlined Iraq's recent efforts to rebuild its nuclear program. The report focused on a variety of issues related to Iraq's nuclear efforts, including procurement efforts, nuclear facilities, consolidation of scientists and uranium acquisition. On the latter issue, the assessment said "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake." The report described the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal and several other intelligence reports on Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The assessment said that "DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources."
If the wording of this report sounds somewhat familiar, don't be surprised. After all, the wording of the uranium claim in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was taken from this DIA report (since the August 2002 CIA report did not mention the uranium claim). But, here is what is significant about the DIA report. For one thing, it did not mention the Joseph Wilson trip as somehow supporting the uranium claim (this is important for many reasons, but primarily because this proves that the DIA's subsequent misuse of the Wilson trip - after the Niger uranium claims were shown to be based on forgeries - is revealed for what it really was: peddling bunk). More importantly through, look at what the DIA report cited in support of the claim that "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake"!
...the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal and several other intelligence reports on Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
This is another open and shut case.
The so-called evidence regarding Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was bunk and that was known from the beginning (as the Robb-Silberman report noted); the SSCI Report went to some length to mislead the public by never pointing this out explicitly. The fact that the entire uranium section in the SSCI was titled "Niger" (not "Africa") is one of the obvious giveaways, but a close reading of multiple Government reports (SSCI, Robb-Silberman, and the British Taylor and Butler reports) has made it abundantly clear that the Bush SOTU uranium claim was only about Niger. In the context of Niger, the "vigorously trying to procure uranium" claim in the DIA report referred specifically to the alleged uranium purchase deal, not just to evidence about an attempt to purchase uranium. In short, in the context of Niger, the origin of the NIE's "vigorously trying to procure" claim was very much the intel about an alleged uranium purchase deal (a sale of uranium), not intel that showed Iraq was only seeking uranium.
The bottom line is that this September 2002 DIA report cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
5. September 11, 2002
As the SSCI Report points out (page 49):
In a written response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on September 11, 2002, National Security Council (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to clear language for possible use in a statement for use by the President. The language cleared by the CIA said, "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient of this process. The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon." The text was identical to the text proposed by the White House except that the CIA had suggested adding "up to" before 500 metric tons. The President never used the approved language publicly.
I have discussed before why the passage above almost certainly refers to WINPAC. That said, look at the wording that was "approved" - "The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material". In other words, intel that alleged that Iraq had purchased 500 tons of uranium was being portrayed as intel that alleged Iraq was trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium.
The bottom line is that this September 11, 2002 "approval" cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
P.S. September 11, 2002 was when the CIA expressed concerns to the British about the credibility of the latter's uranium claim.
6. September 24, 2002
Just like in the previous incident, there was a similar occurrence in late September 2002 (page 51):
In a response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on September 24, 2002, NSC staff contacted the CIA to clear another statement for use by the President. The statement said, "we also have intelligence that Iraq has sought large amounts of uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa. Yellowcake is an essential ingredient of the process to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons." The CIA cleared the language, but suggested that "of the process" be changed to "in the process." The President did not use the cleared language publicly.
I have discussed before why the passage above almost certainly refers to WINPAC. That said, the wording that was "cleared" - "Iraq has sought large amounts of uranium and uranium oxide" - was again a softened description of the actual intel which was about a completed uranium purchase deal. Again, intel which alleged that Iraq had purchased large amounts of uranium was being portrayed as if it only alleged that Iraq had sought to purchase large quantities of uranium.
The bottom line is that this September 24, 2002 "approval" cannot be used to support a claim that Iraq had only sought uranium from Niger.
P.S. It is noteworthy that this emergence of the specific word "sought" in the terminology used by the U.S. government - in this case, initiated by the Bush White House on September 24, 2002 - coincided with the British Government's release of their dishonest "white paper" on the same day, in which the British adopted the "sought" uranium terminology to describe intel that was about a uranium purchase (starting in mid-September 2002).