Take a poll on impeachment (MSNBC)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10562904/
Posted by The Truth at December 22, 2005 08:06 AMthanks for this info.
publishing it shows the difference between the left coaster and the wapo or nyti. readers get the chance to know and evaluate for themselves rather than having editors do it for them.
this info wouold seem very important for the sake of education. it's easier to explain to the public (and to understand) that someone put in a "rush order" for validation of administration claims about iraqi nuclear weapons than to explain some of the more technical details refuting that claim.
i'd love to know who the company was, too.
Posted by orionATL at December 22, 2005 09:19 AM"i'd love to know who the company was, too."
I'd like to know who the mysterious Joe was, too. Does Bolton have a brother?
Posted by DeminNewJ at December 22, 2005 09:37 AMDid I not see somewhere that the contrator was a Duke Cunningham / Wilkes company?
Posted by whenwego at December 22, 2005 10:39 AMYes, you probably did. It was MZM, owned by Wilkes. See for details:
http://www.rense.com/general69/fdiss.htm
and
http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg118075.html
Eriposte,
You put forth the following from the SSCI report:
……. “The contractor produced a paper on September 17, 2002, one day after receiving the information, that said the team concluded, "that the tubes are consistent with design requirements of gas centrifuge rotors, but due to the high-strength material and excessively tight tolerances, the tubes seem inconsistent with design requirements of rocket motor casings."
This contractor needs to be identified and prosecuted. It’s obvious from the statement that he milked the CIA for an entire day’s worth of fees for a (correct) conclusion that an expert would only take 15 minutes to arrive at. Perhaps at some point we could go into this in detail, however right now I would rather address the larger issue.
With the volumes of work you have put into this endeavor, I would think that at some point a quest for the truth would win out over a partisan screed to claim “manipulation”. Your reader (FMJ) has fallen into the same pattern of ignoring some facts, clinging to others that fit his particular mindset and concocting elaborate conspiracy theories to explain away everything else.
With your obvious talents in collecting, organizing and outlining information, you could make a substantial contribution to the world by approaching this analysis as an investigator as opposed to a lawyer trying to make the case for their client. Or, if your legal training has left you incapable of anything but advocate-based thought, go back and take the opposite side of this debate. Use all of your skills – just as if the Tookie Williams appeal rested on the outcome. Then, when you have both cases made, a glimmer of truth should show through the mist. The press is either too lazy or too ignorant (my guess is both) to attempt any comprehensive report on what actually occurred.
NOTE (to the usual bitchers and moaners about me posting):
Eriposte has devoted a great deal of time into researching and writing this series. Considering the comments, I doubt many have read (and even less have understood) what has been painstakingly put forward. Sometimes even critical response can assure the author that their work is being appreciated.
West every time you show up you make a bigger fool of yourself then the time before. You have been proven to be a liar and wrong time and time again but you keep coming back. you are simple a fool.
Posted by Goose1 at December 22, 2005 12:08 PMThe first time someone mentioned "oh, by the way, these are 81mm tubes," anyone with military experience knew why Iraq was buying them.
Posted by Ralph at December 22, 2005 12:15 PMIt can't be emphasized often enough that the experts, the people who actually know how to make a nuclear bomb, who understand the equipment involved, were ignored by the Bush Administration. Guys like Joe, who didn't know squat, was listened to as if what he were saying was gospel because it fit the mindset of the Bush Administration. Assumng that FMJ has gotten things right, and I'm inclined to believe he has based on what I know about these things, I'm struck by the cute compartmentalization where the D.O.E., the experts, denied the aluminum tubes were likely for enriching uranium, but accepted the bunk about the Niger/Iraq uranium angle, an area where they were not likely to have known the specific details, and might not have been given more than convenient summaries of the connection. Then we have the non-nuclear experts in the intelligence community who bought the bunk about the aluminum tubes but who did not accept the Niger/Iraq uranium connection because that had been thoroughly checked out by their people. This smells of major manipulaton.
I need more information about the red teams. Were they composed of only contractors, contractors and sympathetic people like Joe, or some other combination? But there's a feel to this that reminds me of military contractor battles from the 1960s where corporations put together 'experts' with sympathetic generals and members of Congress to create a team to argue their side for a particular weapons systems (the biggest fiasco of that era was the B-1 bomber). In such a system, opinions are not difficult to buy, or in other cases, are subject to manipulation. Cheney and Rumsfeld would know a lot about those games; of course it's a bonus when they find willing, nonexpert believers like Joe. This wasn't about the truth. This was about winning and fixing the evidence around the policy.
Posted by Craig at December 22, 2005 02:56 PMJ. West -
I appreciate your response. I can't speak for eRiposte, but personally, I do try to analyze material from the perspective of an investigator rather than a prosecution/defense lawyer. I question my assumptions. I triple-check my facts. I'm interested in the truth. I have no interest in pinning this on Bush/Cheney if it is not warranted by the evidence.
If I have "ignored some facts", please let me know what they are and how they affect my "elaborate conspiracy theory". Though I stand by my essay (I worked very hard on it), if I'm wrong about anything, I want to know so I can make the necessary changes.
BTW, don't you think it's suspicious that the red team performed the first detailed, pro-nuclear analysis of the tubes only after Bush admin officials had cited the tubes as evidence of Saddam's nuclear program? Don't you think it's suspicious the analysis was done less than a week after Congress requested an NIE on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction? Don't you think it's suspicious that a red team's analysis was used in the NIE and not the analysis of the nuclear experts, the Department of Energy?
See, I want answers to these questions. Don't you do too?
Posted by FMJ at December 22, 2005 09:42 PMDZG, whenwego, et al.
I don't think there's a lot of evidence linking MZM to the contractors/red team. According to the posted WAPO article, MZM got it's first contract with the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in October 2002. The red team had finished their analysis by mid-September. Also, the WAPO says the MZM contract had nothing to do with the tube/rockets/centrifuges but instead was an anlysis of a computer program.
In any case, NGIC was involved with the analysis of the tubes from a rocket-expert perspective. The red team looked at the tubes as centrifuge 'experts'. You'd expect the contractor to come from the centrifuge side of the intelligence community - WINPAC or the Counter-Proliferation Division of the CIA.
I have a hunch (and I'd like to emphasize that a hunch is all it is at the moment) that the red team came from a contractor called Science Applications International Corporation. SAIC is a more likely candidate than MZM though the evidence is pretty thin either way.
Posted by FMJ at December 22, 2005 10:16 PMFMJ,
Good questions. Interesting timing as is everything Bush related...just who was this independent contractor...and why did they need it? Why did they think those Expert industry analysts weren't qualified and was the independent contractor qualified?
As for jwest, this person has no credibility. If you noticed west's posting, he doesn't offer anything factual to support the allegations he just threw at eRiposte. The reason he doesn't is because the one time he did offer something to refute eR using some scant sourcing to back up his own claims (full of typical cherrypicking quotes most likely from a rnc email) , eR came back and handed him his head on a platter. eR was able to do this because he has done extensive and impeccable research which west posting habits reveal he clearly has not. West is Not in the same league as eR, and something tells me he knows it but likes to think otherwise.
Anyway, Thanks for taking interest, paying attention, and trying to get to the bottom of this entire scam that was used to send a nation to War.
FMJ,
I appreciate the work both you and eriposte have put into this and only wish I had the time to go into the detail that it would take to do full justice to the subject. However, there are indisputable facts that lead any reasonable person to conclude that the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program as opposed to rocket motors.
The main problem with the analysis stems from the mistaken impression that the tubes specified were basically the same as ones previously purchased. This perception has been exasperated by the redaction of the cost (of tubes to be built to the specifications outlined in Table 4) and the deletion of the report (written in 1 day) by the experts consulted by the CIA.
Confusion also stems from the intermixing of what constitutes an “expert” in certain fields. A rocket scientist or centrifuge engineer would have only a slightly better chance than a baker or plumber of understanding the vast difference between manufacturing of the Nassar 81 tubes and the ones specified on the chart.
One other factor that is not brought into these reports (or to a great extent in the referenced underlying documentation) is the state of existing capabilities in Iraq at the time these tubes were being sought. Again, knowledge of these capabilities coupled with what the Iraqis were trying to acquire, analyzed by someone with expertise in manufacturing in the context of what the rocket scientists and centrifuge engineers are saying, a correct (or at least most logical) assessment could be obtained.
The main focus on this subject needs to remain the inside diameter (ID). There are many companies that can manufacture tubes to the specifications of the Nassar 81 rockets. These would be easily obtained and well within the cost ranges mentioned throughout the documents ($10 - $20). Tubes manufactured to the Iraqi specification found in Table 4 would, in contrast, be extremely hard to find. The community of manufacturers capable of producing this tolerance (+0/-.1mm) over a length of 900mm in thin wall aluminum tubing is relatively small and the operations involved are anything but inexpensive.
A lot has been made of wall thickness in the Iraqi specifications. In order to use the tubes in a centrifuge, the tubes would need to be cut and the outside diameter (OD) machined down while maintaining concentricity with the ID. This is a relatively easy operation that would only take a few minutes per tube. The one thing the Iraqis would need to accomplish this operation would be large diameter computer controlled lathes, such as those previously manufactured by Churchill-Matrix. Iraq had a number of these machines since the late ‘80s.
In order to effectively machine the OD, it would be important to have a sufficient wall thickness so that the tool is able to “take a bite” as opposed to having a wall thickness that is close to the finish dimension. This is necessary due to the fact that the polycrystalline diamond tooling used is not a sharp instrument, but utilizes a small radius at the cutting edge. If enough stock is not removed in one pass, the material tends to deflect rather than cut. Whether by design or chance, the 3.3mm wall thickness is ideal for a two pass operation, utilizing the first pass for a potential offset in diameter. Even the overall length of the tube is perfect for cutting in half while leaving sufficient stock to clamp to while rotating in the lathe.
Without trying to get into the truly detailed and technical aspects, I hope you have gained some appreciation as to the difference in the commonly-held perception of the tubes and what is the actual case. I would like you to consider the broad question posed by these tubes:
Why would Saddam, who desperately wanted sanctions lifted, institute a clandestine program to acquire (what I hope you now believe are expensive) tubes clearly in violation of these sanctions, when MLRS rockets where easily, cheaply and legally available to him?
Yugo Ferrari
Wheels 4 4
Doors 2 2
Engine 1 (0-60) 1 (0-190)
Material Steel Steel
Beware of slight differences in tolerancing.
(sorry - can't get the table to print properly)
J. West,
My tolerance for serial lying in the comments section is limited. I have learnt to expect that trolls will lie but you take it to an extreme. You don't bother to read any of the established reports on the subject and keep publishing fakery - again and again you publish junk that has shown to be false by the SSCI and RS reports. The points you keep making have been previously shown to be false in previous comment threads and even the CIA has admitted that the tubes were not meant for centrifuges.
I'm not going to tolerate this nonsense for long. I'm at the point where I'm ready to ban you from the comment threads - so consider this your last warning.
I believe in free speech and people's right to express their *opinions* - and state facts - but I draw the line at serial lying.
Posted by eriposte at December 23, 2005 09:05 AMEriposte,
The point in my post addressed to you was a plea to discard your myopic quest to prove manipulation of the facts and strive for a true assessment of the situation. Apparently, this is not an option.
I wish you well on your travels down the road most recently blazed by Mary Mapes. Your well documented research will be praised throughout the liberal community, but then again, they didn’t need you to convince them that everything is a plot by the evil Bush/Cheney empire.
Your worldview seems to imply that all knowledge worth knowing is already published and can be linked to, and if you draw incorrect conclusions you can still make them facts if you link back to them enough. Liberal nirvana is obtainable through the selective publishing of like-minded information coupled with the elimination of dissenting facts, common sense and logic.
Ban me from the site and bask unimpeded in the warm glow of sycophantic ignorance. Be happy in the knowledge that anything anyone communicates that does not agree with your forgone conclusions is, by definition, a lie. Enjoy your life in the “reality based community”.
J. West -
I don't quite understand your argument. Are you saying that the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Iraq Survey Group and the Robb-Silbermann Commission were all wrong when they assessed that the tubes were inexpensive and in fact cheaper than the tubes Iraq had bought for rockets in the 1980s? Are you implying that the tubes' price indicates they were intended for gas centrifuge rotors?
Are you saying the Iraqis needlessly specified tight tolerances for the tubes because they were intended for centrifuges? Or are you saying that the Iraqis planned to machine the tubes to make centrifuge rotors and erase whatever tolerances they'd specified? See, I'm suspicious because you don't actually come out and say what you think the tubes were for. Your arguments also seem to contradict each other.
For the record though, the tubes' price was redacted in the SSCI report but not the RS report. In 2001-2002, Iraq paid up to $17.50 per tube. In the 1980s, they paid almost $20 for rocket bodies. What price would you expect the Iraqis to pay for centrifuge rotors?
Also, gas centrifuge rotors require a tolerance of +/-0.01mm (note the extra decimal place than the Iraqis' specification). Are you suggesting that the Iraqis could machine aluminum tubes with such accuracy? Don't you think it's more likely that the tubes weren't going to be machined at all and were for rocket motor bodies?
"Why would Saddam, who desperately wanted sanctions lifted, institute a clandestine program to acquire (what I hope you now believe are expensive) tubes clearly in violation of these sanctions, when MLRS rockets where easily, cheaply and legally available to him?"
I'm sorry, which MLRS rockets where easily, cheaply and legally available to Saddam? You didn't mention any.
If you could answer the questions I asked you at the end of my first post ("Don't you think it's suspicious...") that would be great.
Posted by FMJ at December 23, 2005 12:03 PMFMJ,
Every one of your questions is valid and deserves a thoughtful response. As time permits, I will get to each one.
In the interest of saving a bit of time, could you please go back and re-read page 105 of the SSCI, with particular attention to the cost issues in what I believe is paragraph (T)(3).
My reading of this passage leads me to conclude that the prices mentioned are for an extruded blank, to the dimensions everyone agrees on, but not made to the tolerances laid out in Table 4. The operative statement reads:
“The analyst did not request specific tolerances which could have raised the price of the tubes.”
If we can both agree on the interpretation of this portion of the SSCI, it would eliminate a lot of typing.
One other point to check just as a time saver.
Could you recheck the .01mm tolerance you mentioned? I agree that this would be an acceptable tolerance for eccentricity (or more accurately cylindricity), but not as an inside diameter tolerance. I believe the reference is found on page 104 of the SSCI for this.
Thanks for your help.
FMJ,
The short version of responses to your questions:
“BTW, don't you think it's suspicious that the red team performed the first detailed, pro-nuclear analysis of the tubes only after Bush admin officials had cited the tubes as evidence of Saddam's nuclear program?”
Honestly, I don’t think it is suspicious. I don’t believe the Bush administration anticipated any question of the intel or motives (on Bush’s part) for the interpretation they presented. Maybe they thought the fact that the tubes were in violation of sanctions, coupled with Saddam’s history of trying to attain nuclear status was prima facie evidence of a renewed program.
“Don't you think its suspicious the analysis was done less than a week after Congress requested an NIE on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction?”
I would think they would try to complete an analysis as quickly as possible once Congress started to look at it. This is just an opinion because I haven’t researched the timing of the request in this context.
“Don't you think it's suspicious that a red team's analysis was used in the NIE and not the analysis of the nuclear experts, the Department of Energy?”
Not really. As we explore the fine points (after nailing the major points such as cost), I think you will agree that most of the “red team” assessment is more credible.
Posted by j.west at December 23, 2005 01:19 PMjwest, you continue to spout blatant lies just as Republican senators and the RNC spouted about Carter and Clinton jsut recently. And just as they were actually called ont he carpet in public on it, they still continue to spout them. Nothing but a pack of lies. Everything you do is to take things out of context and then say there it proves you are correct. All you do is conflate and obfuscate by acting as if you have some high and mighty street credentials(which btw you have never proved or lived up to I can tell you). Then you go on and claim others aren't keeping an open enough mind.
You have never proved your own credentials here....ever. You have never been able to carry your weight here in words against eR in any discussion on this issue...yet you claim to be some sort of industry insider. You still never provide links and the few bare bone quotes and sources you use are to things that have already been debunked. Do you understand YOU have done nothing to prove your credibility or trust here and all your bogus harping on things already proven to be incorrect is disgusting.
Plus You have NEVER honored your bet that you lost. You must really enjoy getting your assed whipped everyday ...because that is what happens everytime you break your promise and post your lies.
What a jerk.... your arrogance is only surpassed by your ingnorance. You have to earn people's respect, not just demand....and your work or arguments have never been able to do that for you. Honestly until you can put up something more credible and quit repeating crap that is clearly crap (repeating it doesn't make it true) you might want to shut up! Your embarrassing yourself.
Posted by emal at December 23, 2005 02:36 PMExtra credit for the real investigators in the crowd.
Explain, in 12 chapters or less, why the Iraqis would want to copy an air to ground rocket (like the Medusa or Mk -66), taking into account that the bulk of the aircraft were already destroyed in the Gulf War.
(emal – just pretend every noun is link that takes you to some other place you don’t understand)
ujest, I am not the one disputing eR's and all other findings to date. The most obvious one being that they never found wmd's in Iraq, and Bush admitted it was all wrong/bad....but guess that isn't good enough even for you. You're the one who has the burden of proof to provide sources, links and such when you're trying to prove your thesis moron, it's not my claim it is yours. You do the research and prove it just as eR did...but that would involve work and learning how to link outside of a "copy and paste" series of cherrypicked quotes from the latest rnc email or wingnut site/source now wouldn't it.
Happy Holidays ujest! Got alot of work in front of you.... will be waiting,not.
Posted by emal at December 23, 2005 05:59 PMJ. West -
Just so I'm clear, you're saying that the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Iraq Survey Group and the Robb-Silberman Commission are all wrong and the red team was, in fact, right? You're saying that the tubes were intended for use in gas centrifuges?
It's strange to me that you're citing the SSCI report in defense of your argument. The SSCI report, as I've mentioned, concluded that the red team was wrong in their analysis of the tubes.
In any case, I'm afraid we disagree on the interpretation of the passage in question. The passage reads:
"Most reports showed, however, that Iraq had negotiated lower prices for the tubes, typically U.S. $15 to U. S. $16 per tube, and as low as U.S. $10 per tube [DELETED]. The DOE told Committee staff that according to the IAEA [DELETED] Iraq paid between [DELETED] for each aluminum tube acquired in the 1980s. If inflation is taken into account, Iraq would be paying less today than in the 1980s for the same tubes. A DOE analyst also contacted a U.S. aluminum tube manufacturer to request a price quote for 7075-T6 aluminum tubes with similar dimensions to the Iraqi tubes. The analyst did not request specific tolerances which could have raised the price of the tubes. The U.S. manufacturer quoted a price of $19.27 per tube, higher than the price Iraq was able to negotiate."
Even with the redactions, it's clear the passage is refering to the tubes Iraq was trying to purchase in 2001-2002. The quoted price ($15-$16) would obviously include Iraq's specification of a +/-0.1mm wall thickness tolerance. The DOE analyst found that tolerances don't significantly add to the cost of aluminum tubes. Similar tubes made by a US manufacturer without specific tolerances were actually more expensive.
So, how much do you think the Iraqis paid for tubes with a +/-0.1mm tolerance?
If the specified tolerance was important, why do you think the Iraqis were going to machine the tubes, when this would have erased it?
BTW, the "J" doesn't stand for "Joe", does it? ;)
Posted by FMJ at December 23, 2005 09:01 PMJ. West -
"Explain, in 12 chapters or less, why the Iraqis would want to copy an air to ground rocket (like the Medusa or Mk -66), taking into account that the bulk of the aircraft were already destroyed in the Gulf War."
According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the Iraqis were reverse engineering the Medusa for use as "ground-to-ground rockets". (RS p. 62)
I'll take that extra credit, thank you. ;)
Posted by FMJ at December 23, 2005 09:23 PMJ. West -
“Don't you think it's suspicious that a red team's analysis was used in the NIE and not the analysis of the nuclear experts, the Department of Energy?”
"Not really. As we explore the fine points (after nailing the major points such as cost), I think you will agree that most of the “red team” assessment is more credible."
Just so we're clear, you do know that the red team assessed that the tubes could be used in gas centrifuges without significant modification, right? No machining the wall thickness, just cutting the tubes in half. In fact, this is one of the main points of my article. The DOE had assessed in several detailed analyses that the tubes could only be used as centrifuge rotors after extensive modification, i.e. wall thinning. I believe that the red team were brought in specifically to contradict the DOE's assessments.
Posted by FMJ at December 23, 2005 09:34 PMJ. West -
"Could you recheck the .01mm tolerance you mentioned? I agree that this would be an acceptable tolerance for eccentricity (or more accurately cylindricity), but not as an inside diameter tolerance. I believe the reference is found on page 104 of the SSCI for this."
You were right. The 0.01mm tolerance necessary for centrifuge rotors is for eccentricity, not wall thickness. However, according to the Iraq Survey Group, Iraq specified the eccentricty tolerance for the tubes between 0.1mm and 0.05mm (ISG, p. 26). The tubes' eccentricity tolerance is still far too loose for gas centrifuges, but does not proclude the tubes from being nice, straight-flying rockets.
Posted by FMJ at December 23, 2005 10:05 PMFMJ,
The critical starting point to understanding the aluminum tube controversy is an understanding of the cost. This was the basis of my post to eriposte and the plea to look into this with an investigative edge.
I believe you are reading the passage in the SSCI just as I am, with an admission that the $10 - $20 price stated does not include machining to the tolerance specified in Table 4. At least we can agree on that. Now, you appear to be saying “well, maybe the cost is without machining to the tolerances, but that would only add a few bucks”.
What I’ve been trying to get across in my writing is the realities associated with metalworking as it relates to these tubes. The specifications and tolerances of the Nassar 81 and the tubes previously purchased by Iraq are at the extreme limit for tubes produced by extrusion. This makes them easy to acquire and reasonably cheap (as in the $10 to $20 price range stated in the documents).
To make the tube to better tolerances, you must machine part. The cost to do this is not a straight line progression as one might think, but rises exponentially as the tolerance is reduced. Also, the cost is not equally divided between the OD and ID machining. In this particular case, the cost of machining the ID would be about 90% of the total, while machining the OD, facing the ends, chamfers etc. would make up the balance. Once the ID is machined properly, everything else is fairly easy including the concentricity.
Normally, the cost of the blank (the extruded tube that you start with) would represent about 20% of the finished price. However, in this instance, the ratio of diameter to length is such that the finished machining price would be higher. I’ve struggled to come up with some type of example that could be linked to, but it’s hard to find one that fits this component closely enough. The closest I can come would be a hydraulic cylinder. If you check a similar length and ID, you will find a cost of about $332.
http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/searchresults.jsp?xi=xi
Keep in mind that this is made of steel (cheap) and is not produced to same tolerances as the aluminum tubes. By reducing the retail price by about 30% (Grainger’s cut), deducting the steel costs (about $15, including rod, note: high carbon steel is selling for about $55/hundredweight today) and the other misc. items (maybe $22 for o-rings, fittings, paint, etc.) you still have over $190 left. As I said, this is not a great example but it does give you some idea of what we are dealing with.
Can I give you a price on aluminum tubes made to the tolerances in Table 4? No. But I can assure you that they would exceed $100 each.
Why would the Iraqis order the tubes to these tolerances if they were going to remachine them for use in centrifuges? Good question. The answer is that they did not have the capability to machine the ID. As stated above, machining the ID is the tricky and expensive part of this whole operation. If the Iraqis received tubes made to the tolerances in Table 4, they could easily cut them in half, leave the ID as it is, put them into their Matrix-Churchill lathes and machine the OD to a wall thickness of 1mm while maintaining concentricity.
As to why these various commissions seem to misunderstand or gloss over this fact, I can only speculate. First of all, these reports where compiled by staff lawyers. The intricacies of what I’m laying out are not that easily understood and there is plenty of room for confusion. Also, there would be a tendency for lawyers to give more weight to nuclear physicist (who has no idea how the components are made) than someone with manufacturing expertise (who does).
If you start with the assumption that everything written in a government report is the unassailable truth, then none of us would ever have anything to bitch about. All I can hope for is that what I’ve given you appeals to your common sense.
Extra credit –
The SSCI report talks about the need for end caps and magnets for a centrifuge. End caps are a piece of cake using the Matrix-Churchill lathes, but magnets posed a problem. Saddam was addressing this by trying to acquire his own production capability.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol2_nuclear-09.htm
Is this what people refer to as “connecting the dots”?
PS to emal: I provided two links in this post. Do I qualify for the hall of fame yet?
FMJ,
Note on the first extra credit:
Explain, in 12 chapters or less, why the Iraqis would want to copy an air to ground rocket (like the Medusa or Mk -66), taking into account that the bulk of the aircraft were already destroyed in the Gulf War."
"According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the Iraqis were reverse engineering the Medusa for use as "ground-to-ground rockets". (RS p. 62)
I'll take that extra credit, thank you. ;)"
This was my mistake for not clearly outlining the question. What I was trying to ask is why the Iraqis would want to copy an air to ground missile (high cost, low weight, small warhead) for use as a ground to ground weapon?
As it appears in the Italian press, the most likely reason would be plain familiarity. The Nassar-81 was based on the Italian Medusa and adapted to be used on helicopters by the Iraqis.
There was extensive military collaboration between the Iraqis and the Italians in the 80's. Many Iraqi Army and Air Force officers were trained in Italy.
When you works with a familiar product, you can cut corners, admitting the hypothesis they were to be adapted as ground-to-ground.
Posted by de Gondi at December 25, 2005 05:39 PMJ. West -
My apologies for taking a while to respond. Christmas is for friends and family, not internet debates about aluminum extrusion. :)
Anyway, I'm afraid you've lost me again. What exactly do you think the Iraqis ordered? Are you saying that the Iraqis specified the ID tolerance (which the extrusion company supposedly machined for them) but not the OD tolerance (which, according to you, the Iraqis could machine themselves)? Did this cost them $15-$20 per tube or over $100?
Also, I'm not sure that you're correct that tighter tolerances are only achieved by machining the tube. Afterall, aluminum cans are produced to tolerances as tight as the Iraqi tubes. Do they machine each individual can for this effect? I was under the impression that tighter tolerances were perfectly possible through extrusion; it just takes longer and you have to exert more control over the process.
You'll be happy to know, though, that I've thought of a way to settle this. I'll email a bunch of aluminum extrusion companies and ask them how they'd go about achieving a +/-0.1mm wall thickness tolerance on a 7075-T6 aluminum tube. I'll also ask how much this adds to the cost of each tube.
If they write back with, "We have to machine the dimensions to get that kind of tolerance - that'd make the tubes well over $100 each," then you're right.
If they write back with, "Tolerances like that are a piece of cake. We just need to slow the extrusion down. It only adds a few bucks to each tubes' price," then I'm right.
Deal?
Posted by FMJ at December 26, 2005 09:35 PMJ. West -
Just to get us back to my essay, the red team didn't base their Sept. 16 assessment on the tolerances of the Iraqi tubes. The tubes' tightened tolerances formed part of the assessment by NGIC, arguing the tolerances were "excessive" for rockets (which the red team quoted). The red team argued that the tubes' dimensions "matched" the design for uranium gas centrifuge rotors. Any thoughts on this?
Posted by FMJ at December 26, 2005 09:45 PMJ. West -
"This was my mistake for not clearly outlining the question. What I was trying to ask is why the Iraqis would want to copy an air to ground missile (high cost, low weight, small warhead) for use as a ground to ground weapon?"
In addition to what de Gondi wrote about the Iraqis' familiarity with the Nasser-81, according to the ISG the Iraqi military had bought launchers for 81mm rockets in the late-nineties. The Iraqi Minister of Defense regularly pressed the Iraqi military to build rockets for the launchers. (ISG, p. 22).
Still under twelve chapters. Can I have that extra credit now? ;)
Posted by FMJ at December 26, 2005 09:58 PMFMJ,
Your suggestion to check with a few manufacturers on the cost of the tubes is excellent. It will be the first piece of truly investigative work done on this subject to date.
When emailing these companies, please specify the dimensions and tolerances as outlined in Table 4. Use care to be accurate in the way these are transcribed, as with the tolerance of +0/-.1mm. This tolerance means that the result can not exceed the finish dimension and may only be .1mm under that dimension. If it is expressed as +/-.1mm, you have, in effect, doubled the tolerance available.
Also, the manufacturers will need to know the length of the tube. It’s far easier to machine a length of 100mm to these tolerances than 900mm.
You may also wish to include a concentricity and roundness specification to help them supply an accurate estimate. The roundness tolerance is mentioned as an afterthought in underlying documents, but I cannot find a specific number assigned to it. This reference to roundness is important because it was part of the Iraqi justification for pursuing tubes this finely machined. They said they wanted superior accuracy and wanted to avoid the rockets “hanging up in the launch tubes”. You can make a tube to the outlined OD, ID and concentricity specifications while still having the finished part shaped like an egg. Without a detailed inspection procedure, the only way to solve this would be the addition of the roundness tolerance.
Also, the subject of surface finish may be raised in the cost estimate. You could specify a 125 micro (which is the default standard on machined parts), but I would think the actual finish called out in the Iraqi documents was far better.
Most manufacturers will not be too anxious to have their quotes revealed with the name of the operation, just for competitive reasons. To gain cooperation, you may want to assure them that any information will be released in some anonymous form such as Manufacturer A, with some price range as opposed to a definitive cost.
You will need to do this in two stages to satisfy your curiosity and arrive at correct costs. First, you will need to contact aluminum extrusion companies to confirm that these tubes cannot be made solely through that process. If you word your price request so that even if the extruder can’t make the tubes to the tolerances requested, they can provide you with a cost and tolerances to the best of their abilities.
I think you will find them coming back to you providing numbers very similar to what is outlined in the SSCI, using tolerances similar to the Nassar 81.
Second, you will need to research machining companies to find ones that have the ability to do this type of work. Your best source would be to have the extrusion companies recommend one, or (if they are really in a mood to be helpful) the extrusion company can request a quote outside with firms they have worked with in the past. Remember, extrusion and machining are two totally different fields.
Just one thought as to another way to proceed. Perhaps you could call or email the staffers who worked on the SSCI report. The confusion about the cost could be cleared up quickly if a definitive answer was found as to the costs quoted in the report. Are they for a tube to the tolerances specified in Table 4, or are they for a tube similar to the Nassar 81? Maybe you could find a staffer who would be available for an hour or two to blog (on the unclassified aspects) with inquiring minds.
I’m glad you’ve taken an interest in finding the truth.
FMJ,
In reviewing David Albright’s work, you may want to consider this passage:
“Fueling the debate, the United States learned of other attempted procurements of aluminum tubes. These tubes had tighter tolerances than the tubes in the order intercepted in Jordan. The CIA and administration officials leaked to the media in September 2002 that earlier shipments [in this 14-month time frame] differed from later ones and the specifications of the earlier shipments were not as clearly suited for nuclear purposes; and "there are tubes and then there are tubes." The tubes intercepted in Jordan were rough inside and later shipments had tighter tolerances on various dimensions. Although these statements tended to undermine the CIA’s earlier case that the shipment intercepted in Jordan contained centrifuge parts, they foreshadowed the next main CIA argument for the tubes.”
What Albright is telling you is that the tubes purchased in the ‘80s, the tubes contracted for with prices in the $10 to $20 range and the tubes intercepted in Jordan are not the tubes specified in Table 4, as the “exquisite” toleranced ones.
That has been the trouble with most of the reporting on this subject. People are lumping different tubes into one pile, while the truth lies in the statement "there are tubes and then there are tubes."
Also, nobody has said the tubes couldn’t be used as rocket motors. It just makes much more sense that given the tolerances of the tubes and the stated desire of Saddam to acquire nuclear capabilities, these tubes (the ones referred to above) where destined for centrifuges.
FMJ,
On your extra credit, put your investigative hat back on.
Here is a passage from the ISG:
"Baqi claims he was not alone on the 2000 committee in questioning why the military wanted the 81-mm rocket, adding that the 107-mm rocket was easier to produce, had fewer parts, and a bigger warhead. Baqi notes the lead production engineer and Kubaysi as two of the 2000 committee members who shared his views that it was a bad idea for Iraq to make the 81-mm surface-to-surface rocket by attempting to copy the Italian air-to-surface rocket. Baqi claimed many engineers wanted to end the 81-mm rocket program in favor of the 107-mm rockets.
• Baqi echoed claims by Dr. Huwaysh that the military apparently wanted the 81-mm rocket because they already had launchers for them. Additionally, Baqi noted quality control was a general problem with the 81-mm rocket program.
• Reporting indicated that the 81-mm rocket program should have been canceled because other rockets in Iraq’s arsenal were capable of fulfilling its role and posed fewer problems. According to this reporting, the nominal 9.5-kilometer range of the 81-mm rocket could be covered by the 107-mm and 122-mm systems with ranges of 1-8 kilometers and 5-20 kilometers, respectively. According to reporting, many military officers were opposed to the 81-mm rocket system, but they allegedly were overruled by more senior leadership. According to reporting, the 81-mm rocket suffered about twice as much scatter as the 122-mm rockets Iraq produced."
The Iraqis who thought the tubes were to be used as rockets couldn’t understand why the 81mm program wasn’t dropped because of the problems and cost. Their other systems gave them a better “dead infidel/dinar” ratio and were easier to produce. They kept being overridden by “higher officials”.
On top of that, they had 500 tons of 122mm stock to make the more accurate and deadly MLRS rounds. Doesn’t it seem implausible that they were so interested in tubes for smaller rockets that were a constant pain in the ass to make?
j. west,
At this point I'm not sure about the value of exhaustively taking apart every one of your allegations and your fanciful "dot-connecting". The basic fact is that the centrifuge case for the aluminum tubes is, and has always been, a joke. The evidence against it is simply overwhelming. If you insist on pressing your "case", I will be happy to address it systematically in eR's next post on the aluminum tubes hoax.
That said, I must note two things.
(1) I can see no credible basis of any kind for your claims about the cost of the tubes Iraq sought/purchased in 2000-2. Your arguments in this thread appear to be based on a basic misreading of the SSCI. Here is what you have claimed:
In the interest of saving a bit of time, could you please go back and re-read page 105 of the SSCI, with particular attention to the cost issues in what I believe is paragraph (T)(3).My reading of this passage leads me to conclude that the prices mentioned are for an extruded blank, to the dimensions everyone agrees on, but not made to the tolerances laid out in Table 4. The operative statement reads:
“The analyst did not request specific tolerances which could have raised the price of the tubes.”
and:
I believe you are reading the passage in the SSCI just as I am, with an admission that the $10 - $20 price stated does not include machining to the tolerance specified in Table 4. At least we can agree on that. Now, you appear to be saying “well, maybe the cost is without machining to the tolerances, but that would only add a few bucks”.
FMJ provides the actual SSCI passage in question (I add the first sentence of the paragraph):
A [DELETED] intelligence report does indicate, as the NIE notes, that Iraq may have agreed to a price of about U.S. $17.50 per tube in an attempt to procure aluminum tubes. Most reports showed, however, that Iraq had negotiated lower prices for the tubes, typically U.S. $15 to U.S. $16 per tube, and as low as U.S. $10 per tube [DELETED]. The DOE told Committee staff that according to the IAEA [DELETED] Iraq paid between [DELETED] for each aluminum tube acquired in the 1980s. If inflation is taken into account, Iraq would be paying less today than in the 1980s for the same tubes. A DOE analyst also contacted a U.S. aluminum tube manufacturer to request a price quote for 7075-T6 aluminum tubes with similar dimensions to the Iraqi tubes. The analyst did not request specific tolerances which could have raised the price of the tubes. The U.S. manufacturer quoted a price of $19.27 per tube, higher than the price Iraq was able to negotiate.
There is absolutely nothing in this paragraph -- or elsewhere in the SSCI Report -- that even remotely suggests that the negotiated prices for the tubes are for anything other than the finished products, constructed to the tolerances specified by the Iraqi 2000 committee. The “operative” statement you quote does not refer to prices negotiated between the Iraqis and tube manufacturers in 2000-2; you completely misunderstand it. It refers to a quote sought by the DOE of an American manufacturer as part of the DOE’s attempt to investigate the so-called centrifuge case. Presumably the point was to see whether the prices which the Iraqis were known to have paid or negotiated with foreign manufacturers were in fact reasonable prices, or whether they were, as the CIA claimed, exorbitantly high and therefore indicative of a “special project of national interest”. The whole point of including the U.S. price quote here is to show that the Iraqis’ inclusion of high tolerance requirements in their stipulations to foreign tube manufacturers did not make the end price of the tubes exorbitantly high. In fact, the price quote from the U.S. tube manufacturer was notably higher than the actual prices paid/negotiated by the Iraqis for their tubes in 2000-2, even though the U.S. quote did not include specific tolerances and the Iraqi negotiated prices did. In other words, (a) the Iraqis were getting a good deal, and (b) the requirement of high tolerances did not substantially increase the final price of the tubes the Iraqis sought.
Note that it was the CIA — the agency trying its darnedest to make the so-called centrifuge case — that was arguing that the Iraqis had paid U.S. $17.50 for each tube, and that this price was exorbitant (and indicative of ulterior designs for the tubes). Note the exact language of the section heading in the SSCI (each section heading represents a different argument made by the September 2002 CIA tubes assessment). It reads:
“Iraqi Agents Agreed to Pay up to US. $17.50 Each for the 7075-T6 Aluminum Tube. Their Willingness to Pay Such Costs Suggests the Tubes Are Intended for a Special Project of National Interest”
There is no evidence in this paragraph you have cited, nor anywhere else, that these quoted prices did not include construction to the tolerances specified (e.g. in ISG’s Table 4). (And the suggestion that these prices were simply for “extruded blanks” is just plain bizarre. Among other things, what would be the point of analysing such prices?) Moreover, there is simply no evidence in any of the WMD reports that the tubes sought/purchased by Iraq in 2000-2 required further machining (and by whom, exactly?) after shipment (?) in order to match the required tolerances. (They did need to be cut down from 900 to 868 mm., but this was also true of the tubes purchased in the 1980s, which were indisputably used for rocket motors. This is not substantial machining.) I’m not sure if this is what you’re claiming, but then none of your argument seems to me to hang together. If this is what you’re arguing, it too is an absolutely bizarre claim, and almost certainly false. It is not mentioned — or even logically implied — in any of the WMD reports. In fact, it is patently obvious that all the reports presume the opposite: that the prospective manufacturers were the ones expected to meet the requested tolerances in manufacturing the tubes. See e.g. the following paragraphs from the SSCI (100-1):
When questioned about the assessment that Iraq’s requested tolerances would have been unusually tight for rockets, the WINPAC centrifuge analyst told Committee staff that intelligence reporting showed that “almost every country [the Iraqis] approached has told them we cannot make tubes to these specifications,” suggesting that the tolerances were so tight that manufacturers would not even try to make them. Because this statement contradicted information previously provided to the Committee which showed that Iraq was working with several companies to try to procure these tubes, the Committee requested intelligence to support the analyst’s contention.The analyst provided six intelligence reports to the Committee, but only one of the six showed that any company from any country told the Iraqis that they could not make the tubes to the specifications requested. The report does not say which specifications the manufacturer could not meet so it is unclear whether this is due to the tolerances. [DELETED] These reports did indicate that the manufacturers did not always meet the requested tolerances, but in several cases Iraq accepted the tubes nonetheless. The reports did not show that “Almost every country [the Iraqis] approached told them we cannot make the tubes to these specifications.”
(Note, as an aside, the part I have italicised: it is yet another nail in the coffin of the CIA tolerances argument.)
In fact, as Pat pointed out in a comment in a previous thread, you appear, ironically, to have things exactly reversed. The tubes sought/procured by Iraq in 2000-2 did not require any real machining in order to be deployed for reverse-engineered Nasser rockets. As Albright points out -- and the same point is either explicitly made or logically implied by every one of the WMD reports --, “By tightening the tolerances, the accuracy [of the rockets] can also be improved without any machining of the walls of the tube.” In stark contrast, the tubes required substantial modification/machining in order even to be a candidate for use in what would inevitably prove a highly inefficient centrifuge. And, devastatingly, such machining would destroy any tolerances to which the tubes had originally been manufactured.
(2) Following from this last point: you appear to be trying to claim that in order to use the tubes for a centrifuge, they could be machined from the outside but left alone in the interior. This is contradicted in various places. For instance:
Butler Report, pp. 131-2, §536:
It was clear from an early date that, on the basis of the specifications of the tubes Iraq was seeking to acquire, they would have required substantial re-engineering to make them suitable for gas centrifuge use, including reducing them in length, and machining metal off the inside and outside. This was paradoxical, since Iraq had laid down very fine tolerances for the tubes.
Albright, Separating Fact from Fiction, pp. 26-7:
Most have said that the tubes would need to be machined before they could be used in a centrifuge, particularly a Zippe-type machine. One reason is that the walls of the tubes have to be shaved to achieve proper balancing, which is necessary for high speed rotation. Shaving would also remove the anodization from the shaved surface. In some situations, Joe argued that the wall would be cut to a thickness of one millimeter, furthering undermining the importance of the tolerances. The tubes in the Barak order had rough interiors and would have required machining.
SSCI, p. 105:
… any machining Iraq had to perform to change the wall thickness of the tubes would also change the interior surface of the tubes, making a request for a smooth finish unnecessary if the tubes were intended to be used in a thin walled centrifuge.Posted by KM at December 28, 2005 11:26 PM
FM,
You seem to be on the same path as eriposte when it comes to critical evaluation of information. What would be your response if you were arguing evolution and some crazy bible thumper kept linking back to the “world was created in 6 days” verses.
My contention remains that these reports combine (and thus confuse) different purchases and attempts at purchasing aluminum tubes. I believe the reports were authored by individuals who had not fully understood the differences between previous tubes and ones sought with tighter tolerances.
In direct contradiction to Albright’s assertion, in this instance, tolerances are a far better indicator of the end use than dimensions.
I will concede that it is impossible to convey 20 years of manufacturing experience in a few posts. What is absolutely clear is that if you can discover how these tubes were made to the Table 4 dimensions and tolerances for less than $20 - and be able to duplicate the process - you will become an extremely rich manufacturer.
The final assessment of any argument over the tubes or the yellowcake must answer a simple question:
Wouldn’t you, given the history of Saddam and the fact that everyone agrees that these tubes could be used for centrifuges (however unlikely you may think), considered in the atmosphere directly following 9/11 and assuming the responsibility for the safety of every person in the country rested on your decision, assume the worst?
j. west -
I'm afraid that you were wrong. Tight tolerances such as 81.0mm (+0/-0.1) and 74.4mm (+0.1/-0) are possible without machining. It's a process called "deep drawing". Deep drawing is used precisely when you need very tight tolerances but your order is so huge (say 60,000 pieces) that machining is cost prohibitive. It keeps the price down.
So, did the company that provided Iraq the aluminum tubes use deep drawing? Yes, it did. The company was Kam Kiu Aluminum Extrusion Co. Their website is here:
http://www.kamkiu.com/english/main.htm
Kam Kiu's page on seamless and drawn tubes, which is what the Iraqis ordered, is here:
http://www.kamkiu.com/english/seamless_drawn_tubes.htm
Tight tolerances are unusual but are not cost prohibitive, as long as the tubes are "drawn" and not machined.
So, I agree with KM (s/he is not yours truly, BTW). There is no evidence that the aluminum tubes cost any more than what the SSCI and Robb-Silberman Commission reports say they did: between $15-20 per tube.
Do you agree?
Posted by FMJ at December 30, 2005 12:56 AM"Wouldn’t you, given the history of Saddam and the fact that everyone agrees that these tubes could be used for centrifuges (however unlikely you may think), considered in the atmosphere directly following 9/11 and assuming the responsibility for the safety of every person in the country rested on your decision, assume the worst?"
The point of my article was that a red team was 'shoe-horned' into the NIE process to ensure the majority position supported the tubes' use in centrifuges without modification. Would I have used a red team to argue to Congress something my experts had said wasn't true? No. Absolutely not.
However, I will say that I would never have let Iraq have the tubes. They were a violation of international law (which, as unpopular as it is, I believe in). Plus, I wouldn't have wanted Saddam to have more Nasser-81 rockets either. That said, I would have ensured sanctions stayed in place and any other similar shipments were intercepted and confiscated.
What I would not have done was invade the country, get 1000s of Americans and 10,000s Iraqis killed (god knows how many wounded), plunge Iraq into a low-intensity civil war, add to the volitility of a volitle region responsible for 80% of the world's oil, create a fundamentalist Shiite axis from Tehran to Beirut, and hand a massive propaganda victory to Al-Qaeda!
Hope that answers your question.
Posted by FMJ at December 30, 2005 01:27 AMj. west -
"On top of that, they had 500 tons of 122mm stock to make the more accurate and deadly MLRS rounds. Doesn’t it seem implausible that they were so interested in tubes for smaller rockets that were a constant pain in the ass to make?"
Iraqi bureaucracy. What can I say?
Posted by FMJ at December 30, 2005 01:36 AMFMJ,
I’m glad you’re still with us now that we’re banished to the archives.
Kamkiu is one of the most advanced extruders in the world. They have some of the best machinery and creative engineers, but they can’t make a tube to the tolerances we have been talking about.
Apparently, Albright and SSCI staff lawyers were reading the same passages you did when evaluating these tubes. I can see where they could get the (mistaken) impression that it was possible, but a little further digging will show you that I’m right.
First, let’s talk about the different processes mentioned (with reckless abandon) throughout the reports and see what each one is.
Deep Drawing: Deep drawing manufacturing technology is defined as the stretching of sheet metal stock, commonly referred to as a blank, around a plug. The edges of the metal blank are restrained by rings and the plug is deep drawn into a top die cavity to achieve the end shape that is desired. There are many shapes that can be made through deep drawing and stamping such as cups, pans, cylinders, domes & hemispheres, as well as irregular shaped products.(definition pasted from site)
Learn more at: http://www.toledometalspinning.com/services/deep_drawing/
Because the deep drawing process is one that stretches the metal, it is limited to certain diameter/wall thickness/depth (length) ratios. These vary with the type of material, but I can assure you the tubes we are discussing fall far outside the capabilities of this method. I will continue looking, but I can’t find any reference to a deep drawing operation close to this diameter with lengths any longer than about 10”.
Flowforming: Flowforming, also known as flowturning, is an advanced form of spinning. It is based on a predetermined reduction of the thickness of a starting blank or preform. The reduction is closely controlled, which results in a very uniform or precisely varied wall thickness in the finished part..(definition pasted from site)
Learn more at: http://www.pmfind.com/process/flowforming.asp
There is also a helpful animation of the flowforming process at the above site.
You can see a rocket motor formed using this process by the same company using this link:
http://www.pmfind.com/casestudy5.asp
Flowforming is an extremely precise method of making a tube, but the term “precise” is relative. To gain an appreciation of what is possible using this method, go to this site:
http://www.flowform.com/flowforming/cap_sizes_tolerances.php
Click in the appropriate size button (3.00” – 3.99”) and note the tolerances that can be achieved. As you will see, it is far from the tolerances we are looking for.
Next, let’s revisit Kamkiu. As I have stated previously, this is a kick-ass operation that knows what they are doing. Their website showcases some round forms with the tolerances they achieved. Remember, the Chinese are showing off their impressive capabilities here so take these numbers as the best they can do.
http://www.kamkiu.com/english/roundtubes.htm
Now that we’ve established that our tolerances can’t be achieved through deep drawing or flowforming, I hope we can put to rest the notion that no machining was necessary. It should also put to rest the notion that even the ID alone could be flowformed to the necessary tolerance.
As I said to KM, if there is some method out there to cheaply ($10 - $20) make tubes to the dimensions and tolerances we are discussing, let me know about it. I’ll split the first couple hundred million in profits with both of you.
FMJ,
On the more philosophical side of the conversation concerning the decision to go into Iraq, I come in squarely on the side of Bush.
Yes, this is quite a gamble. But if it succeeds and 10 years down the road there is a functioning democratic society in the heart of the Middle East, it was very much worth while.
Once you give people a taste of freedom – voting, free speech, internet, Bay Watch on TV, etc., it’s almost impossible to take it away. Advances in Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and even Syria (although rarely reported) are encouraging.
Just think of how the world will look if we are successful. I believe one of the craziest liberal moonbats on the planet (Chris Matthews) had it right when he said that “if Bush pulls this off, he’ll be on Mt. Rushmore”. Can you imagine eriposte, soto and coyote when they start carving that?
FMJ,
Here is a better flowform animation:
http://www.flowform.com/flowforming/methods_overview.php
Posted by j.west at December 30, 2005 11:47 AMOne other thing,
Since this is an exceptional site to evaluate flowforming, check the form on this page (short, fat cylinder along the far left).
http://www.flowform.com/flowforming/cap_geometries.php
You will remember from the various reports (please don't make me go back and find it) that the Iraqis were going to (supposedly) machine threads onto the tubes to connect the warheads.
The figure illustrates one of the great things about flowforming - namely the ability to roll form threads that are perfectly concentric to the ID and OD. Concentric threads are important if the goal is balance and accuracy. This is truly a cheap operation that only takes a fraction of a second to accomplish.
If the tubes were for rocket motors, why wouldn't the Iraqis include this in their specifications?
Posted by j.west at December 30, 2005 12:14 PMFMJ,
Before launching into the debate I should have congratulated you for your excellent and informative article. I really hope to get a chance to say more about it at some later point.
j. west,
(1) If you have the least bit of concrete, credible official evidence from anywhere
(a) that the Iraqis paid or agreed to pay more than U.S. $20 per tube in 2000-2, for any shipment;
(b) that the CIA or any other agency pushing the centrifuge case actually claimed that the Iraqis at some point paid or agreed to pay more than U.S. $20 per tube in 2000-2;
(c) that any WMD report discusses any mutually agreed-upon tube price for any shipment out of the U.S. $10-20 range; or
(d) that the prices referred to in the WMD reports -- e.g. SSCI, p. 105 -- do not refer to and specifically exclude either (i) finished tubes built to the tolerances set by the 2000 Committee (i.e. set out, maximally, in ISG's "Table 4") or (ii) post-Kam-Kiu procurement agreements involving more finely toleranced tube requests
-- if you have any such evidence, please present it.
Until then, against the mass of documentary evidence, and against statements in official reports stating that these prices were not only possible but were as a matter of brute historical fact actually negotiated, we have only your personal assurances that the reported prices were impossible. Forgive me if I remain sceptical. I don't, for one thing, know who you are.
The fact, well known to anyone who has followed the case, that in 2000-2 the Iraqis made different procurement requests with different tolerance requirements, in no way implies that the SSCI (and CIA, and the NIE) price reports on p. 105 are wrong, incomplete, or inapplicable to the higher-toleranced tube requests. The passage you quoted from Albright to FMJ in an earlier comment has absolutely nothing to do with prices, and you simply have no basis to draw from it an inference that the SSCI and other reports are conflating different Iraqi procurement requests. Of course, you actually need to make a far stronger argument, because even if SSCI/R-S/NIE were lumping together without distinction different tube requests in their discussion of the tubes' prices, that would certainly not mean in and of itself that the most finely-toleranced requests were much more expensive than $20 -- i.e. were outside of the price ranges discussed. Presumably if SSCI/R-S/NIE were lumping the different requests together, the higher-toleranced requests would simply represent the upper-limit prices. Instead, you would have to demonstrate that their confusion about different requests led SSCI/R-S/NIE/etc. to altogether neglect or exclude (and please do us the honour of pinning yourself down to one) the higher-toleranced requests from the price discussion. And I'd really like to see the documentary evidence for this.
In response to FMJ, you write:
Apparently, Albright and SSCI staff lawyers were reading the same passages you did when evaluating these tubes. I can see where they could get the (mistaken) impression that it was possible, but a little further digging will show you that I’m right.
Albright and SSCI "staff lawyers"? Let's leave aside the likelihood that outside experts were consulted (even, possibly, some with "20 years of manufacturing experience"!) -- and anybody who has followed Albright's work on the tubes knows that on top of his own particular expertise he has consulted experts extremely widely and in a diverse number of fields (beyond the many other sundry experts at ISIS). What about the CIA, DIA and NGIC? What about every single intelligence agency that collaborated in producing the NIE, which, as the Robb-Silberman Report tells us (p. 72),
cites reporting indicating that Iraq paid “up to” $17.50 for the tubes, and noted that the willingness to pay this “high” price was indicative of the high priority of the purchase — a fact which, it is suggested, supports the view that the tubes had nuclear application.
[Footnote 168: "NIE at p. 17. See, e.g., Classified intelligence reporting (Aug. 2001); (Jan. 2002); see also SSCI at p. 105."]
Are you claiming the CIA/DIA/NGIC did not have intelligence about the prices negotiated/anticipated/paid by the Iraqis for the highly-toleranced tubes? Are you claiming that these agencies would not have the technical expertise to know whether these prices were technically plausible/possible? That they would not have access to people knowledgeable about extrusion and machining, particularly of rocket components? Are you claiming that the CIA/DIA/NGIC deliberately withheld the known prices of the later tube requests from the investigating commissions? Or that the commissions deliberately decided not to discuss them? Are you claiming that the CIA/DIA/NGIC, all unabashed advocates of the cockamamie centrifuge theory, would not have been able to make the same arguments you make both to the SSRC and, in the heat of the debate, to the DOE, which specifically challenged their tolerances arguments? Particularly if they had evidence of, say, a U.S. $80-per-tube cost negotiated/paid by the Iraqis, or of the technical impossibility of a $10-20 price range? And even if the CIA/DIA did not know what prices Iraq negotiated for its most highly-toleranced tube requests, don't you think they might have thought to claim exactly what you are, and would not have rested satisfy to make what must be, from your perspective, the rather lame claim that U.S. $17.50 was a "super-price" to pay for the tubes? Is there any particular reason why such arguments/evidence were not, as far as we know, included in the CIA tubes assessment of Sept./02 nor in that of the NGIC of Nov./02? And not in the NIE?
Like FMJ, I'd like to pin down exactly what your argument is, and think answers to these questions would be a good start. If you can add to your answers specific, credible, official/documentary evidence, I'd be even more impressed. Until then, I'm inclined to view claims of extravagant tube prices starting at a minimum of U.S. $100 to be the product of a rather fevered imagination.
Posted by KM at December 30, 2005 12:53 PMKM,
As to questions 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c), I have no specific government document to prove what I have been asserting.
Moving then to 1 (d):
“(d) that the prices referred to in the WMD reports -- e.g. SSCI, p. 105 -- do not refer to and specifically exclude either (i) finished tubes built to the tolerances set by the 2000 Committee (i.e. set out, maximally, in ISG's "Table 4") or (ii) post-Kam-Kiu procurement agreements involving more finely toleranced tube requests”
My posts have been directed toward proving that the $10 - $20 price range was not conceivable for the finely toleranced tubes (Table 4).
FMJ’s analysis of a “red team” assessment of the facts is insightful in that it brings the opposite into question – a “blue team” worldview on the part of certain elements in the Duelfer, Robb – Silberman and SSCI staff.
On your next point -
“-- and anybody who has followed Albright's work on the tubes knows that on top of his own particular expertise he has consulted experts extremely widely and in a diverse number of fields (beyond the many other sundry experts at ISIS).”
“That they would not have access to people knowledgeable about extrusion and machining, particularly of rocket components?”
Who are these experts and what is their area of expertise? As I’ve tried to explain in prior posts, if these are rocket experts or centrifuge experts they would have no applicable knowledge of the points I have raised concerning these tubes. I have no expertise in rocket or centrifuge design, but I do know about machining.
I tried in my last post on this subject to give you links to manufacturing operations similar to those described in the reports. If you study the available information at these sites, you will see that these forms of metalworking cannot achieve the tolerances in question. Deductive reasoning must, therefore, bring you to the conclusion that additional work needed to be performed if Iraq was to receive tubes to those tolerances.
“Are you claiming the CIA/DIA/NGIC did not have intelligence about the prices negotiated/anticipated/paid by the Iraqis for the highly-toleranced tubes? Are you claiming that these agencies would not have the technical expertise to know whether these prices were technically plausible/possible?”
The CIA/DIA/NGIC did have intelligence about the prices paid and negotiated on tubes previous to ones in question. What they did not possess is the knowledge of what the difference would cost to obtain the newly toleranced tubes. Apparently, this “Joe” had some idea of that the new tolerances would disproportionately affect the price and the “red team” expert who wrote his report in less than 1 day also knew about the subject.
It seems the IAEA (which I would consider a “blue team” player) went out of its way to discredit Joe’s assessment, but I have not seen any substantive rebuttal on the “red team” expert except for the “one day” retort.
“Are you claiming that the CIA/DIA/NGIC deliberately withheld the known prices of the later tube requests from the investigating commissions? Or that the commissions deliberately decided not to discuss them? Are you claiming that the CIA/DIA/NGIC, all unabashed advocates of the cockamamie centrifuge theory, would not have been able to make the same arguments you make both to the SSRC and, in the heat of the debate, to the DOE, which specifically challenged their tolerances arguments? Particularly if they had evidence of, say, a U.S. $80-per-tube cost negotiated/paid by the Iraqis, or of the technical impossibility of a $10-20 price range?”
I don’t know what went on in the meetings held by these various agencies. Was this a mistake or was it deliberate? Again, without knowing the people, their backgrounds and agendas, I can’t make that call. Some people could have walked into the room with the “cockamamie centrifuge theory” imbedded in their heads and saw everything through that prism. Others, convinced that Cheney personally waterboarded CIA analysts until they saw things his way, may have been in mode to, if not totally ignore, just not pursue each fact to the ends of the earth. With apparently no definitive Iraqi contract signed and sealed outlining a price for tubes with the tight tolerances, the requirements outlined in Table 4 became the stuff footnotes are made from.
“And even if the CIA/DIA did not know what prices Iraq negotiated for its most highly-toleranced tube requests, don't you think they might have thought to claim exactly what you are, and would not have rested satisfy to make what must be, from your perspective, the rather lame claim that U.S. $17.50 was a "super-price" to pay for the tubes?”
I believe some in the CIA/DIA did try to make the case, but either through design or confusion on the part of “staffers” the reports ended up with the muddled ambiguous language you find throughout. It is clear that tubes of different designs have been lumped into one category with an “accepted” price of $17.50 (or in that area).
“Is there any particular reason why such arguments/evidence were not, as far as we know, included in the CIA tubes assessment of Sept./02 nor in that of the NGIC of Nov./02? And not in the NIE?”
I believe that in Sept/Nov ’02 the CIA and NGIC took as a “given” the position that these tubes were destined for a nuclear program. Chasing the details was not a priority because who would believe the implausible theory that they were for rocket motors?
“If you can add to your answers specific, credible, official/documentary evidence, I'd be even more impressed. Until then, I'm inclined to view claims of extravagant tube prices starting at a minimum of U.S. $100 to be the product of a rather fevered imagination.”
The previous post is a good starting point as far as documentary evidence. If you are looking for a government report that backs this information up, it hasn’t been written yet.
Take the first step into the world of critical thinking by examining the data I’ve outlined concerning the tolerances. Start by answering the question:
Can the tubes be made to the “exquisite” tolerances by deep draw, flowforming or extrusion?
If the answer is no, then you’ve crossed into the wonderful world of real world thinking. From that point, we can determine the rest of the answers.
j. west -
"I’m glad you’re still with us now that we’re banished to the archives."
Yeah, I bookmarked my own essay. What can I say? ;)
"Flowforming is an extremely precise method of making a tube, but the term “precise” is relative. To gain an appreciation of what is possible using this method, go to this site:
http://www.flowform.com/flowforming/cap_sizes_tolerances.php
Click in the appropriate size button (3.00” – 3.99”) and note the tolerances that can be achieved. As you will see, it is far from the tolerances we are looking for."
Thanks for the link. The inner diameter of the Iraqi tubes was 74.4mm. That's 2.9in. The "appropriate size button" is 2.50"-2.99". When we click this we get ID and wall thickness tolerances of +/-0.002in. That's +/-0.05mm. That's right on the money for an ID tolerance of +0.1/-0mm. It's also well inside a wall thickness tolerance of +/-0.1mm.
So, how much does your average flowforming job cost?
BTW, I'm still trying to get in touch with Kam Kiu. Gonna have to wait until after the New Year, though. Bare with me?
Posted by FMJ at December 31, 2005 12:14 AMj. west -
"Apparently, this “Joe” had some idea of that the new tolerances would disproportionately affect the price and the “red team” expert who wrote his report in less than 1 day also knew about the subject."
Actually, neither Joe nor the red team based their arguments on the tubes' tolerances. That was actually NGIC and they cited the tolerances only as evidence that the tubes were unlikely to be for rocket bodies (a little like what you're doing). Joe and the red team argued that the tubes' dimensions matched centrifuge rotors, and could therefore be used as such, which was not true.
Posted by FMJ at December 31, 2005 12:27 AMKM -
Thanks for your comments. There is actually a lot more to this story. I wanted to write about the spin-tests performed on the tubes, the apparent complicity of NGIC and how the whole thing relates to the Niger scam, but the damn essay was pushing 10,000-plus words as it was. Hopefully I'll be able to get something together in the next month or so.
Posted by FMJ at December 31, 2005 12:33 AMj. west -
"Just think of how the world will look if we are successful. I believe one of the craziest liberal moonbats on the planet (Chris Matthews) had it right when he said that “if Bush pulls this off, he’ll be on Mt. Rushmore”. Can you imagine eriposte, soto and coyote when they start carving that?"
If Bush pulls this off in ten years, I'll contribute to the campaign to get him on Mt. Rushmore. Hell, I'll go door-to-door to get people to sign the petition. But I think in ten years we'll be thinking of 2005 as the good old days when it was only Iraq in chaos and filling your car with gas didn't cost half your paycheck.
But really the outcome of the war is immaterial to my essay. Let's say there hadn't been an insurgency and the Iraqis had sat around singing Kum Bae Ya and God Bless America instead. I'd still be concerned that a red team had written the most important section of the NIE and almost single-handedly justified the war (although, if everything had gone well I doubt I would ever have learned of it). What if some future president used a red team to justify a war with China? Or Europe? Or Americans of a certain political ideology? Are you comfortable with giving the president that kind of power?
Posted by FMJ at December 31, 2005 12:54 AM