Back up in time, would CIA Langley have sent out a routine or othersie memo to Castelli (and what other embassies) telling them to have a heads up on any activity with either Niger uranium and/or Iraq's involvement ... would Castelli have used his own initiative? In a Cheney world, I could imagine the conversation going along lines of, Castelli to Langley: Just got some interesting papers from Rocco, had my guys look at them, they look like forgeries; Langley to Castelli: good job, courrier them over to us for our guys to look at, just for the record.

>> would CIA Langley have sent out a routine or othersie memo to Castelli (and what other embassies) telling them to have a heads up on any activity with either Niger uranium and/or Iraq's involvement ... would Castelli have used his own initiative?

Both of these describe likely scenarios.

>>> Langley to Castelli: good job, courrier them over to us for our guys to look at, just for the record.

Possibly. Something close to this may have occurred.

You, sir and/or madam, are a blogging demigod. It makes me feel small and insignificant to be your 'sibling'.

So, it's pretty clear that Big Time Dick and/or his miniona would've known it was false. Which means that they lied, and 1000's of lost lives later, justice has not been served.

When the bill gets paid, this work of yours will be part of the indictment.

Just caught your post and would like to thrash out a point over the famous page 36 of the SSCI report. As you’ve noted the October 18th, 2001 memo from the Sismi confirming the Sismi’s trust in La Signora is not mentioned in the report. This was later revealed in an article in Il Messagero and followed up by la Repubblica as you link.

But what has me wondering is the actual scenario behind the October 15 report as detailed on page 36:

“Reporting on a possible uranium yellowcake sales agreement between Niger and Iraq first came to the attention of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) on October 15, 2001. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Operations (DO) issued an intelligence report [redacted] from a foreign intelligence service indicating that Niger planned to ship several tons of uranium to Iraq [redacted]. The intelligence report said the uranium sales agreement had been in negotiation between the two countries since at least early 1999, and was approved by the State Court of Niger in late 2000. According to the cable, Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja gave his stamp of approval for the agreement and communicated his decision to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The report also indicated that in October 2000 Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs Nassirou Sabo informed one of his ambassadors in Europe that Niger had concluded an accord to provide several tons of uranium to Iraq. [Redacted].”

To the best of my knowledge this was based on a report from Jeff Castelli, Rome field officer, which had been sent prior to that date. The excellent book, Il mercato della paura, that details Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D’Avanzo’s ongoing investigation of the Niger forgeries has an interview with Greg Thielmann, ex-director of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, on the matter. Mr. Thielmann declares in May 2004 (page 102):

“... It’s a synthesis that Langley received from their field officer stationed in Italy. The agent declared that thanks to the collaboration of the Sismi, he had been able to see, but not copy, some pages that documented an attempt by Iraq to buy at the beginning of 2001 [sic?] over 500 tons of uranium from Niger. The CIA, as is the routine in these cases, passed on the report to the other intelligence agencies, such as ours [INR], so as to have an evaluation. Just reading it, the piece of paper should have been trashed. Whatever way you looked at it, the story couldn’t stand on its own two feet.... One of my best analysists regularly handled relations with the CIA and in circumstances like this, he began to badger the Agency so that they would turn over some additional information on the source. On our database we have routine files on all sources of information on WMDs, and this helps us create a sort of archive on their reliability. Well, the CIA was unable to give us an answer. They continued to tell us for weeks that they were trying to obtain something more. And above all, the documents on which the report was based. However, they repeated, as some sort of independant confirmation of the report, that the Italian Services were certain that Iraq had attempted to buy uranium from Niger.”

In brief, Castelli had seen enough pages from the (doctored?) false dossier to report information on which the DO based their October 15 intel report.Apparently at about the same time Rocco Martino tried to peddle his version to Castelli.

Now from a common sense point of view, you just don’t walk into the US Embassy in Rome and ask to chat with the head undercover CIA agent. Security has always been very tight there long before September 11. The story of Martino being kicked out of the embassy with his wares seems to be a tale told with some extra frills. If it did occur, Martino had his channels- and very good ones- if he actually met with Jeff Castelli.

Thanks for the great work!

I thik it's close to time for a narrative summary of the whole body of your work on the Niger Forgeries: what really happened; what questions are answered; what questions are open; what remains to be found out. It's hard to hold on to the details, even for your ardent readers. It's also time to put your work "to work."

You have more than enough evidence for reopening the inquiry. It would be lovely if your fine investigation was in a form that someone could jump on if the midterm elections break the Seige on the Congress we've been living with. Plame is important, but way, way second fiddle to the Niger Forgeries.

De Gondi,

>> In brief, Castelli had seen enough pages from the (doctored?) false dossier to report information on which the DO based their October 15 intel report.Apparently at about the same time Rocco Martino tried to peddle his version to Castelli.

There are two documentary sources here.

One is the forgeries themselves (from Martino) and the other is the selective or altered extracts from the forgeries (from SISMI). Bonini and Thielmann are almost certainly discussing the latter. My post is focused mostly on the former. But your larger point is very important. Castelli was the guy who probably saw both - and by all accounts that must have raised his suspicions. He may have therefore told Langley that he considers the SISMI information to be somewhat dubious.

>>> The story of Martino being kicked out of the embassy with his wares seems to be a tale told with some extra frills. If it did occur, Martino had his channels- and very good ones- if he actually met with Jeff Castelli.

Very good point. In fact, this is what bugs me the most about the media's lack of interest in this story - there are very important incidents which have seen so little reporting or investigation. I would really like to understand what happened in Fall 2001 and October 2002 in the US Embassy in Rome. The SSCI Report censored a lot of it. I wish some reporter digs into it further.

Mickey,

>>> it's close to time for a narrative summary of the whole body of your work on the Niger Forgeries: what really happened; what questions are answered; what questions are open; what remains to be found out. It's hard to hold on to the details, even for your ardent readers. It's also time to put your work "to work."

I understand your frustration...but I need to lay out the details before I can summarize the plot. I need some more time this month to wrap up the details (on what is known) and I'll try to provide the big picture story in July. Thanks for your patience.

eR, this is just incredible and I think you have once more proven your point. What did you think of Unger's article? He certainly pulled together the story I think is most plausible - but how much is speculation and how much is fact I still don't know.

I can hardly wait for your overall summary.